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1 Introduction 
The regulatory climate in European banking sector has been in turbulence since 2008 
financial crisis, that started in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, 
and then expanded into global scale. The crisis meant increased burden of capital 
requirements, new requirements with regards to corporate governance 
arrangements and processes and financial reporting for the banks (A comprehensive 
EU response to the financial crisis 2014, Introduction). In 2018, there are several new 
regulations, which Financial Institutions need to have implemented such as Network 
and Information Security Directive, EU General Data Protection Regulation and 
Payment Services Directive 2, the two latter requiring most of the effort to comply 
with. 
In May 2017, European Banking Authority started the process of drafting 
recommendations for outsourcing to cloud computing, built on the existing 
Guidelines on outsourcing developed by the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) in 2006 but extending its scope further to address the use of 
cloud computing. The intent is to clarify the EU-wide supervisory expectations if 
Financial Institutions intend to adopt cloud computing, so as to allow them to 
leverage the benefits of using cloud services, while ensuring that any related risks are 
adequately identified and managed (Recommendations on outsourcing to cloud 
service providers 2017).  
Based on replies to European Commission Consultation on FinTech, both Finnish 
(Finanssivalvonta 2017a, 12) and Swedish (Finansinspektionen’s response to the 
Commission Consultation Document on FinTech 2017, 1) Financial Supervisory 
Authorities have a positive and constructive attitude towards outsourcing to cloud; 
however, they emphasize meeting financial sector specific regulations such as right 
to perform inspections through contractual arrangements. Finansinspektionen’s 
administrative fine of 25 million SEK to Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag in 2016 
demonstrates that outsourcing monitoring and risk management can be a 
challenging task for a financial institution (Decision FI Ref 15-9258, 2016). According 
to European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) publication 
Secure Use of Cloud Computing in the Finance Sector, cloud computing is gradually 
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being adopted within the European financial industry while the vast majority of 
financial institutions still rely on in-house infrastructure. The report further reveals, 
that the approach for cloud adoption is not yet mature and it is being adopted to 
only a limited number of use cases. (Secure Use of Cloud Computing in the Finance 
Sector 2015, 5).  
PSD2 regulation requires banks to grant third party access for Payment Service 
Providers or Account Information Service Providers without extra costs to their 
customers’ accounts and payment services securely following customer consent. 
PSD2 regulation and Open Banking Initiatives yet extending the PSD scope shape the 
competition landscape, which forces Financial Institutions to adapt to changes more 
rapidly and reposition themselves in the digital value chain. European Banking 
Federation members share a view that digitalization is one of the main methods for 
banks to increase their competitiveness, with 90% of banks stating that digitalization 
is a priority for them. The growth of FinTech and digital payment solutions provide 
particularly interesting opportunities. (Competitiveness of European Banks and 
Financial Technology 2017.) 
This master’s thesis focuses on conforming to EU General Data Protection Regulation 
and outsourcing guidelines of European Supervisory Authority in the context of 
outsourced, cloud based self-service channels in online banking. Prior research work 
available focuses on: 
  customers’ perspectives on adoption of cloud computing in finance sector (Cloud 
Computing - Factors that affect an adoption of cloud computing in traditional 
Swedish banks by Emma Lundberg and Caroline Åkesson, 2015),  
 data protection in cloud computing in Sweden (Data protection in cloud computing – 
The Swedish perspective by Dan Svantesson, 2012), 
 and developing a reference architecture for financial services in the cloud (Banking 
2.0: Developing a Reference Architecture for Financial Services in The Cloud by Ana 
Bucur, 2011). However, none of these theseis focus on summarizing and linking 
compliance requirements in financial sector to an architectural and regulatory 
context.   
 
There is no commonly recognized definition for online banking self-service channels, 
which means some effort is spent on explaining and defining the boundaries of the 
context and service architecture and finally interpreting what this means from the 
compliance point of view. Overall, a self-service channel could consist of capabilities 
and artifacts such as contracts, IT processes and business continuity, technical 
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architecture and capabilities, (requirements on) skills and knowledge for operating 
the service context. By channels, one could understand mobile bank, Internet bank, 
Interactive voice response (IVR) technology, corporate banking clients or any 3rd 
party applications delivered over PSD2 APIs, where the APIs would be the channel to 
the infrastucture of a Financial Institution. Ana Bucur’s thesis (2011, 74) coins out a 
definition of Customer Interaction Cloud as a solution package or component being 
part of a banking reference architecture taking care of all customer interaction 
integrating mobile accessibility, Internet portal and Call Center solution. The scope of 
Customer Interaction Cloud and Front Office Distribution Channels of the thesis 
corresponds on a high-level to the scope of this master’s thesis; however, this thesis 
does not take any product-centric approach in blueprinting the solution components 
nor is it based on any proprietary architectural models to come up with a reference 
architecture. 
The motivation behind this thesis is to create a reference of applying relevant 
financial industry recommendations and regulations to a business and technical 
context. As context, financial self-service channels are in the focal point of 
digitalization, customer engagement and experience, new PSD2 enabled business 
models, online threats, fraud and in addition subject of rapid cycle of innovation. 
2 Research strategy 
2.1 Thesis structure 
In the approach to the research presented here, the thesis begins with formulation 
of the research problem and context, followed by a description of qualitative 
research methods, data collection and data analysis. 
The research context is introduced in more detail with the definitions of solution 
architecture, operative environment and identification of relevant and applicable 
compliance schemes. These are also one of the starting activities in the approach 
outlined by ISO 19600 compliance management system based on the continual 
improvement Plan-Do-Check-Act principle as illustrated in (Figure 1). (ISO/IEC 
19600:2014, Introduction). 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of ISO 19600 compliance management system 
 
 
After identification of the external and internal issues and the requirements of the 
interested parties, ISO 19600 proposes to determine the scope and establish the 
compliance management system (Compliance management systems — Guidelines 
2014). 
The research context is followed by a deep-dive into each of the regulations, 
guidelines, recommendations and interpretations within the scope of cloud 
outsourcing and data protection as well as summarization and classification of the 
topic in hand to form a requirement base. 
The requirement base is used to reverse engineer an abstract compliance solution 
architecture for online banking self-service channels, which link the architecture and 
requirements together. 
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Conclusions and suggestions on future research around the research problems are 
described in the end of the thesis. 
2.2 Research field 
Legal informatics is interdisciplinary and strives to complement the traditional legal 
perspective with perspectives from the field of informatics (Seipel 2010, 32). As a 
science, it researches the relationship between law and information, law and 
information technology, and issues arising from regulation and interpretations of the 
regulation in the operating environment. More specifically this thesis falls into the 
category of information technology law (IT law). Information technology law refers to 
the legal field that examines legal regulation and interpretation issues relating in 
particular to the design, implementation and use of IT solutions including IT-based 
products and services. (Saarenpää 1998, 1.) 
2.3 Research problem 
There is plenty of research and publications on e.g. outsourcing, data protection 
regulation or cloud security in general, however there are less sources focusing on a 
specific business service, domain and technological context. Without a well-defined 
context-setting, an outsourcing institution and a service provider are both more 
likely to cause misunderstanding and struggle in fulfilling their obligations and share 
of legal and information security risks. 
Key research questions of the thesis are wrapped around following themes: 
 What regulations, guidelines, recommendations and proprietary standards apply to 
outsourcing of online banking self-service channels? 
 How does the scope of business requirements or technical architectural boundaries 
affect the number of regulatory provisions? 
 What characteristics does a compliant architecture have and what aspects does it 
consists of? 
 What type of compliance issues related to outsourcing do the financial institutions 
struggle? 
 What type of compliance issues do service providers struggle with in financial 
services domain? 
 What is the supervisory attitude or climate on outsourcing in general and 
outsourcing to cloud? 
 How a standard compliance management system help an undertaking to mitigate 
compliance risks 
12 
 
 
2.4 Research objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive view on legal frameworks, 
recommendations and requirements applicable to online banking channels such as 
mobile and Internet bank in an outsourced delivery environment. The compliance 
requirements are further translated into a compliance solution architecture in the 
given context based on interpretations of the compliance requirements. The thesis 
further attempts to interpret potential pitfalls in complying with the regulations and 
recommendations. 
The application of the thesis work can help a service provider to reduce mutual 
commercial risks by providing information what type of security controls, processes 
and reporting is required on a practical level and guide towards a compliant service 
contract. It can also help by giving a baseline of risks for risk analysis and risk 
management process. From the financial institution point of view, added value could 
be found in common vocabulary and gaining understanding for discussing the 
requirements and their practical mitigation strategies with a service provider and 
capability to recognize characteristics, which a compliant architecture should have. 
2.5 Research methods 
As the thesis consists of both interpretations of law and compliance requirements 
but also blueprinting a compliance architecture, its research methods utilize legal 
dogmatics and are based on qualitative deduction. Legal dogmatics is associated with 
interpretations and systematization of legal norms (Aarnio 1999, 334). 
Abstraction and blueprinting of solution architecture based on requirements is a 
result of both textual data analysis, interpretation of the regulations and deduction 
of conclusions made on how those requirements can be met. Deduction is generally 
drawn and concluded from established facts and evidence (Leavy 2014, 588). 
2.6 Data collection 
Qualitative data sources in general include observation, fieldwork, interviews, 
questionnaires, documents, texts and the researcher's impressions and reactions of 
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the researcher (Whitman & Woszczynski 2004, 309). In this thesis qualitative data 
sources are based on publicly available resources such as regulations, consultation 
papers, surveys and technical guidelines (RTS) of European Banking Authority, annual 
reports and rulings or decisions of Financial Supervisory Authorities and earlier 
research work in the financial services domain in Europe. 
2.7 Data analysis 
Data analysis is based on qualitative content analysis. Ole Holsti (1969, 14) offers a 
broad definition of content analysis as any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. Klaus 
Krippendorff (2013, 24) has stated that "Content analysis is a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from data in their context”.  
The requirement base of data collection is analyzed by coding and categorizing 
against ISO 27001:2013 and ENISA Cloud Computing Information Assurance 
Framework. The key sections of ENISA Cloud Computing Information Assurance 
Framework framework are based on the broad classes of information security 
controls from the ISO 27001/2 and BS25999 standards (Information Assurance 
Framework 2009, Methodology). Any indirect evidence in form of an obligation is 
recursively abstracted back to a recommendation or a requirement.  
The objectives and controls of ISO 27001:2013 were seen as most suitable 
framework compared to 27032:2012 and ENISA Cloud Computing Information 
Assurance Framework correlating well with the requirements set by EBA for 
outsourcing. ENISA IAF emphasizes more data portability, which is abstracted to 
business continuity and exit strategies by EBA outsourcing regulation. According to 
Segovia (ISO 27001 & ISO 22301, 2015), controls that can be found in ISO 27032:2012 
are more specific for cybersecurity such as application level controls, server 
protection, end-user and social engineering attack controls. In comparison ISO 
27001:2013 standard of information security management is more generic, less 
concrete, extensive and global without cyber security emphasis. 
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2.8 Reliability of data collection and analysis 
As the renewed outsourcing recommendation to cloud by European Banking 
Authority is not yet well established, there are no case examples of supervisory 
assessments based on the recommendation. However some of the decisions or 
rulings can be interpreted as applicable also under the new recommendation as only 
minor refactoring is done in considering the unique characteristics of cloud 
computing and cloud based services. Some of the same old concerns still remain with 
the new recommendations and legislation entering into force. This will have some 
impact on the reliability of interpretations due to the lack of official interpretations 
by authorities or court. Instead, the interpretations are as good as the quality of the 
different sources, showing interest in interpreting the data protection regulation and 
contributing to outsourcing recommendations, and that they are used as references 
in this thesis work. 
Due the fact that security and non-compliance are sensitive topics in financial 
industry, which is largely based on consumer and market trust, not all information is 
publicly published by Financial Supervisory Authorities supervising the financial 
institutions. This is evident when comparing the difference between volume and the 
level of material published by Finnish and Swedish Financial Supervisory Authorities. 
There is more public auditing information published by Finansinspektionen. 
Therefore, the identified best practices or demonstration of compliance as means of 
evidence to be produced to meet a specific recommendation or guideline is by no 
means inclusive. 
Lastly, using systematically defined coding protocols improves measurement by 
removing elements of researcher biases and improving thoroughness and accuracy. 
However, content analysis as a method loses relevance and ability to reach 
important aspects of legal interpretation in cases, where coding objectively is almost 
impossible due to nuances related to infrequent or highly complex factual and 
procedural patterns. (Hall 2011, 6). 
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3 Compliance management systems for establishing context 
and compliance risk management 
Adoption of a compliance management system is a good practice to demonstrate 
regulators and authorities that an organization is seeking to be in line with the 
regulative provisions or guidelines. ISO 19600 also follows a risk-based approach in 
which the identified risks in context of compliance requirements and commitments 
are the basis of action. (Ernst & Young LLP, 2015). EU General Data Protection 
Regulation sets a requirement, where the controller should be obliged to implement 
appropriate and effective measures and be able to demonstrate the compliance of 
processing activities with this Regulation, including the effectiveness of the measures 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 14). 
ISO 19600 guidelines on compliance management systems are applicable to all types 
of organizations, but the extent of the application of the guidelines depends on the 
size, structure, nature and complexity of the organization (Compliance management 
systems - Guidelines 2014).  
By looking at the structure of the standard reflected on e.g. Figure 1, it can be seen 
that there is an emphasis on structuring and aligning the organization with the effort 
required to have a holistic view on compliance. Work packages such as good 
governance principles, identification of interested parties, leadership and 
commitment, independent compliance function, responsibilities at all levels, are all 
examples of continuous support and commitment for compliance work in order to 
come up with a culture, which produces behavioral norms  conducive to compliance 
outcomes. 
This thesis does not focus on describing a case study on how to organize compliance 
management. Instead, the same risk-based approach was applied to identify 
compliance risks in thesis context in Chapter 12. Identification of compliance risks 
was a one-off effort and at this stage, as it was sufficient to only have a list of risks 
instead of planning, what is their priority or exact mitigation plan. 
However, what is worth analyzing, is the root cause of non-conformance or 
noncompliance. Nonconformance occurs when something does not meet the 
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specifications or requirements in some way. Noncompliance is the failure to adhere 
to an Act or its Regulations. Examples of root causes could be lack of competent 
resourcing, lack of independent compliance function or lead role, not considering 
compliance as integral part of “definition of done” of business service development 
or lack of practice of measuring and reporting compliance. Analysis and continuous 
improvement are parts of performance evaluation and compliance reporting as well 
as managing non-compliances and continual improvement as suggested by ISO 
19600:2014 standard. 
4 Regulatory and outsourcing context of the thesis 
The outsourcing context of this thesis is limited to outsourcing instructions of 
guidelines published by European Banking Authority for national supervisory 
authorities of the EU member states. The same applies to EU General Data 
Protection Regulation.  
Most EU member states have comprehensively transposed the CEBS guidelines, the 
current guiding framework regulating outsourcing activities. A survey carried out by 
the EBA during 2015 indicated, that of the 24 national frameworks 53% totally 
transposed, 38% partially transposed and 8% did not transpose the CEBS guidelines. 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 21). Due the fact that the thesis has been 
written before access to information to which extent the recommendations on 
outsourcing to cloud will be transposed in different EU member states, the thesis 
focuses on understanding the baseline, that national supervisory authorities are 
expected to implement under the ‘comply or explain’ principle.  
Some references are also made to statements of Finnish and Swedish national 
supervisory authorities, which are in specific interests of the company behind the 
thesis assignment. 
There are two primary factors having impact on the outsourcing context: the 
category of financial institution e.g. a credit institution or investment firm impacting 
applicable outsourcing guidelines and regulations and secondly the architectural 
boundaries of the business domain related to outsourced online banking channels. 
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The architectural boundaries are explained further in the chapter on compliance 
architecture. 
The outsourcing context of the thesis focuses on both IT Outsourcing (ITO) as well as 
Application Development and Maintenance (ADM), where the former has been a 
very traditional and active area of outsourcing as illustrated below in Figure 2 and 
having focuses less on Business Process (BPO) or Knowledge Process Outsourcing 
(KPO).  Offering online banking channel as an outsourced service means at least 
combination of both ITO and ADM types of outsourcing based on Software as a 
Service delivery model.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: References of FS Sourcing Operating Models in 2010 (Elix-IRR Partners, 
2011). 
 
 
Because online banking channels stand for branding, customer engagement, 
customer experience and end customer business process innovation, which are all 
challenging to measure as KPIs, financial institutions want to maintain control and 
ownership over how their channels are further developed according to their business 
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strategy. Therefore outsourcing online banking channels is not about pure Business 
Process Outsourcing, which according to Gartner’s definition means the delegation 
of one or more IT-intensive business processes to an external provider that, in turn, 
owns, administrates and manages the selected processes based on defined and 
measurable performance metrics (Gartner, 2018). However, the outsourcing context 
of the thesis does cover processes such as IT administration, service monitoring, 
service support and further development (implementation) of the services according 
to specifications of financial institutions. 
Examples of Knowledge Process Outsourcing are banking and financial research 
services, market research, analytics, auditing and legal services, which could be 
perceived as add-on outsourcing services part of a service portfolio. 
5 Regulative climate on outsourcing to cloud in Finland and 
Sweden 
5.1 Finanssivalvonta (FIN-FSA) 
Finanssivalvonta’s response to FinTech survey by European Banking Authority (EBA) 
concluded that the recommendations of EBA together with generic security and 
privacy regulations provide a sufficient basis for regulating cloud computing services 
(Public consultation on FinTech 2017, 12). Further in the response (ibid., 12.), 
Finanssivalvonta states it does not see any specific regulatory or supervisory 
obstacles, that would prevent financial services firms from using cloud computing 
services as long as both the financial sector specific and generic regulations, such as 
general data protection, online privacy and NIS, are met. Finanssivalvonta does 
highlight in the response (ibid., 12.) the fact that financial institution  must ensure 
that the national competent authorities’ rights to perform inspections are 
guaranteed through contractual arrangements made with the cloud computing 
service.  
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5.2 Finansinspektionen (SWE-FSA) 
Based on a response by Finansinspektionen to FinTech survey carried out by 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the financial supervisory authority of Sweden 
recognizes within banking industry the interest in cloud services and it being a driver 
for innovation; however also the challenges due uncertainty of supervisory 
expectations (Finansinspektionen’s response to the Commission Consultation 
Document on FinTech 2017, 4). In the same response (ibid., 4.) Finansinspektionen 
announces taking a positive stance on upcoming EBA recommendations on 
outsourcing to cloud service providers. According to Finansinspektionen (ibid., 4.) the 
recommendation provides the clarity needed for adopting cloud computing  and 
ensures that risks are appropriately identified and managed.  
The latest statement titled “Promemoria” from Finansinspektionen (2018, 1) 
concluded, that even if in some cases cloud services contribute for more stable IT 
environments and ultimately better and cheaper financial services for consumers, 
the services also involve risks that need to be addressed. A company that wants to 
use cloud services must ensure that the company, its auditors and FI have access to 
relevant information and suitable premises if necessary to be able to check and on-
site inspect the outsourced business at a cloud service provider (ibid., 1). 
If a cloud service provider for legitimate reasons wants to restrict access to e.g. a 
datacenter, and an unlimited access is not necessary to check the outsourced 
operations, the need for such limitation according to Finansinspektionen (SWE-FSA) 
does not necessarily prevent the company from entering into an agreement. 
However, agreements with restrictions for auditing must have been through 
thorough risk analysis. They also need to be able to convince Finansinspektionen 
(SWE-FSA), why the restrictions do not affect the company's control capabilities. 
(ibid., 1). 
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6 Overview and structure of Financial Supervision and 
regulation in Europe 
6.1 Supervising authorities 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) is one of the specialized EU agencies set up by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. In accordance with 
Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (“the EBA regulation”), EBA issues 
guidelines and recommendations addressed to competent authorities, with a view to 
establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices and ensure the 
common, uniform and consistent application of European Union law (EBA 2017a, 5). 
Each EU member country has a local, national supervisory authority, for example 
Finanssivalvonta, the Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA), is the authority for 
supervision of Finland’s financial and insurance sectors established and authorized in 
Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta 2017b, Supervisory 
Disclosure).  
The illustration in Figure 3 covers the regulative bodies and key documents in the 
context of the thesis. The data protection regulation is directly applicable to each of 
the European countries starting from 25 May 2018.  
The deadline for competent authorities to report whether they comply with the 
cloud outsourcing recommendations will be two months after the publication of the 
translations, which were not yet available at the time of writing. The 
recommendations will apply from 1 July 2018. (ibid., 4). In the meanwhile, the 
national outsourcing guidelines continue to be effective until they are revised. The 
recommendations are not exhaustive, and should be read in conjunction with the 
CEBS guidelines (ibid., 7).  
Payment Service Directive 2 has a sub-RTS defining requirements for Strong 
Authentication in respect to acting as Payment Initiation Service Providers (PISP) or 
Account Information Service Providers (AISP), which sets requirements for online 
banking customer strong authentication process for making payments. 
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Figure 3: key regulative bodies, authorities and regulations illustrated in thesis 
context 
 
6.2 Relevant regulation in context of online banking self-service 
channels 
During the writing of the master’s thesis, three regulations and guidelines were 
identified to have major impact on the content of the thesis: EU GDPR, CEBS 
Guidelines on Outsourcing and Recommendations on Cloud Outsourcing of European 
Banking Authority, where the latter is built on top of principles set in CEBS guidelines 
and should be read in conjunction with CEBS.  In addition there are other regulations, 
which could be applicable to online banking channel’s business or system 
architecture, which do not introduce additional requirements to outsourcing context 
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as such as PCI-DSS, Payment Service Directive 2, European Anti-Money Laundering 
and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), electronic identification and 
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. In addition, EBA 
Guidelines on ICT risk under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation process 
introduces several control assessment requirements for authorities, which in reverse 
can be interpreted as implementation requirements. These requirements are aimed 
for financial institutions to e.g. secure websites and applications that can be directly 
attacked from the internet or the outside, and that can serve as an entry point into 
the internal ICT systems in a specific way (European Banking Authority 2017b, 28). 
7 Analysis on interpretations of regulations and guidelines 
based on sanctions and decisions of National Financial 
Supervisory Authorities 
There is a significant difference in terms of publicity and sanctions between the 
approach Finanssivalvonta (FIN-FSA) and Finansinspektionen (SWE-FSA) have steered 
financial institutions on outsourcing.  
7.1 Finanssivalvonta (FIN-FSA) 
According to Finanssivalvonta’s (2013) presentation slides, they have done audits on 
operative risk management e.g. in the area of retail and corporate Internet banking 
services, IT outsourcing and especially continuity planning in system renewal 
projects. Further, Finanssivalvonta’s (2015) annual report from year 2015 states it 
has carried out auditing on security of Internet banking, IT risk management, IT 
outsourcing, continuity planning and preparedness for incidents. 
According to the same presentation (ibid), supervised entities including financial 
institutions, pension and insurance companies the continuity planning should be 
more accurate, do not always provide sufficient guiding and should be tested more 
often. In addition, information is typically not backed up to a third location outside 
dual site setup. (Finanssivalvonta, 2013). 
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There were no public remarks or sanctions in the area of outsourcing or operative 
risk management given by Finanssivalvonta nor any generalized report available for 
the public. Instead the room of improvement has been handled according to the 
process one-to-one between the supervisory authority and a financial institution and 
some hints on activities and generalized improvement areas can be found in e.g. 
presentations. 
The only information available about the findings is the list available on the 
presentation highlighting challenges in operative risk management including 
strengthening of the risk assessment function, providing instructions with better 
quality for different areas (e.g. operative risk management, continuity planning, AML, 
KYC), risk reporting and transparency to board of directors, more accurate process 
descriptions and risk assessments, more efficient follow-up of IT programs, backup 
and continuity arrangements for payment transactions, training for Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC). (Finanssivalvonta, 2013). 
To summarize these findings per category of control are illustrated in Table 1 below. 
As a conclusion, none of the findings are related to challenges in outsourcing or data 
protection as such. 
 
Table 1: Samples of operative risks identified during assessments by Finanssivalvonta 
(FIN-FSA) 
Finding Category 
Strengthening of the risk 
assessment function 
7 Support, 7.1 Resources 
Instructions with better 
quality for different areas 
8 Operation 
8.1 Operational planning and control 
Risk reporting and 
transparency to board of 
directors 
6.1.2 Information security risk assessment 
More efficient follow-up of 
IT programs 
A.6.1.5 Information security in project management 
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Backup and continuity 
arrangements for payment 
transactions 
A.17.2.1 Availability of information 
processing facilities 
 
7.2 Finansinspektionen (SWE-FSA) and case Nasdaq Clearing 
In 2016, Finansinspektionen focused on assessing how companies managed cyber 
risks (Finansinspektionen 2016b, 1).  In case of Nasdaq Clearing, the company holds 
authorization to provide clearing services as a central counterparty. 
Finansinspektionen conducted the same investigation at their sister company, 
Nasdaq Stockholm Aktiebolag, which operates the regulated market, Nasdaq 
Stockholm. The Nordic subsidiaries in the Nasdaq Group, including Nasdaq Clearing, 
have outsourced a large part of their functions to the parent company, Nasdaq Inc. 
including, among others, information security. (ibid., 2). 
Finansinspektionen found issues in the areas of outsourcing, risk management and 
business continuity. Regardless of the fact that the gaps were identified against 
provisions set out in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories (EMIR), the gaps are perfect examples of the risks European Banking 
Authority wants to avoid by publishing recommendations for credit institutions and 
investment firms. This case example pinpoints all the key pitfalls in the outsourcing 
domain.  
The outsourcing contract s contained no detailed descriptions of the current services, 
quality measures (KPIs) nor did it have a formal service level agreement (SLA) (ibid., 
5).  
The company had no evidence to show, that they have received continuous 
information or follow-up statistics that provide an overview of the service delivery 
nor there was ongoing follow-up of the agreement and the delivery. Since the 
agreement has lacked SLA for information security services, in practice it was not 
possible for the company to carry out any detailed monitoring. Finansinspektionen’s 
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opinion is that effective monitoring of outsourced functions requires in minimum a 
regular follow-up of the delivery. (Finansinspektionen 2016b, 6). 
According to Finansinspektionen’s evaluation, Nasdaq Clearing, as regards to cyber 
security, had in practice delegated its responsibility to the service provider. The 
company's board of directors has also not taken responsibility for the management 
of company risks.  
Because there has been no exchange of information about the relevant cyber risks 
between Nasdaq Clearing and other parties that the company is technically 
connected with, the Financial Supervisory Authority assessed that Nasdaq Clearing 
lacked a comprehensive and comprehensive view of relevant risks. The investigation 
showed there was a risk management tool, however the tool to date was not used to 
manage cyber risks (ibid., 8). 
The board of directors of Nasdaq Clearing had not defined, determined and 
documented the central counterparty’s appropriate risk tolerance level and risk 
bearing capacity with regard to cyber risks. (ibid., 9).   
The questionnaire showed, Nasdaq Clearing had no process, which would have made 
decisions about risk tolerance. Therefore, there were no clear rules how threats 
affect what investments to cyber security are needed. The group's risk management 
strategies were not anchored to the company financial plans, which means the 
company did not have financial contingencies for managing the risks. 
Finansinspektionen evaluated, that cyber risks were not covered by a risk 
management system as per requirement. (ibid., 10). 
Finally, Nasdaq Clearing had not made any analysis of the most suitable strategy for 
recovery in cyber-related scenarios including IT systems being attacked or 
information being manipulated or corrupted.  Neither were there any preparations 
for alternative arrangements or documentation of tested scenarios to ensure the 
company would be able to recover its critical functions or IT systems in a timely 
manner. (ibid., 10). 
As a result of the deficiencies and their severity in different areas under the 
assessment, Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag was fined for SEK 25 million (ibid., 17). 
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7.3 Aftermath of Nasdaq Clearing case 
Article 35(1)(g) of EMIR (EU Regulation No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories) states, when outsourcing, the central counterparty shall retain the 
necessary expertise and resources to evaluate the quality of the services provided 
and to supervise the outsourced functions effectively and manage the risks 
associated with the outsourcing. The central counterparty shall also supervise these 
functions and manage these risks on an ongoing basis. (Finansinspektionen 2016b, 
3). 
The requirements of the article captures the essence of the issues that Nasdaq 
Clearing had in demonstrating with evidence that these requirements have been 
implemented in practice. To explain why it happened would be guess-work and the 
type of aftermath that does not give much justice for the case. However, to take an 
opposite approach and list a few things that would likely produce positive outcomes 
is more constructive.  
By having a solid dialog with the supervising authority about the planned outsourcing 
arrangement and discussing the expectations and matters to consider would most 
likely give some pointers to requirements in EMIR and instructions. During the same 
dialog, the company and the supervising authority could have exchanged information 
on risk landscape. At that time, Finansinspektionen’s risk analyses had identified 
cyber-attacks against financial infrastructure companies as a significant risk, in part 
because there was high probability, and in part because such attacks can cause 
extensive damage including damage to confidence in the financial markets (ibid., 4).  
In addition, by taking advantage of any outsourcing guidelines and risk management 
frameworks or best practices would provide support on considering good principles 
of steering and monitoring the outsourcing arrangement. 
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8 EU General Data Protection Regulation and outsourcing 
8.1 Scope setting 
EU General Data Protection Regulation including 88 pages of articles regulating 
personal data protection of EU citizens presents a massive topic to cover in the first 
place. As this thesis is about outsourced online banking channels as a service scope, 
the aim of this thesis is to summarize the obligations from processor point of view in 
order to capture the essential topics of the interface between an outsourcing party 
(controller) and the vendor or supplier (processor) – mainly covered by articles 28 
and from 32 to 36. This means less focus is put on describing the obligations set for 
the controller alone, which would be a financial institution in this case. However, 
some effort is given on describing privacy principles as part of compliance 
architecture. 
Another scope limitation concerns the type of personal data in question. Online 
banking channels do not process any sensitive personal data such as data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, data concerning health or sex life and sexual orientation, genetic 
data or biometric data. There is no need under any circumstances of an online 
banking channel to process or persist any personal data categorized as sensitive 
according to EU General Data Protection Regulation. 
Even though data itself is not categorized as sensitive by the regulation, the service 
processing context should be considered as high risk, in case the processing is about 
evaluation or scoring, including profiling and predicting. A concrete example of this is 
customer screening against a credit reference database or a company building 
behavioral or marketing profiles based on usage or navigation on its website (Data 
Protection Working Party 2017a, 8). Another example could be personal finance 
management service providing insight to an individuals’ financials and consumer 
behavior. High-risk processing means a controller is subject to Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) to describe and demonstrate the compliance with the 
regulation and address the risks (ibid., 7) assisted by relevant data processors if any. 
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8.2 Data protection definitions linked to thesis context 
Self-service channels of outsourced online banking in Europe process personal data 
of data subjects, i.e. EU citizens in the role of banking customers. "Personal data" 
means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ("data 
subject"); an identifiable person is one who can be directly or indirectly identified. 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 33)  
The personal data available via online banking channels is a subset of data stored in 
financial institutions’ customer register overall. Data is processed and stored for various 
purposes and for example Danske Bank A/S, Finland Branch declares they process 
personal data for identifying and recognizing data subjects, in order to manage contact 
details, for risk management and securing transactions, for direct marketing, for 
managing e-registration, storage, reporting and replying obligations pursuant to the law 
and in accordance with authorities’ regulations and guidelines (Danske Bank, 2018). The 
data is collected during the customer engagements in relationship or an application 
for entering into a customer relationship concerning e.g. account or credit (ibid.). 
Another typical scenario for a bank is to carry out payments and transfers (The 
processing of personal data in Mobile Bank app, 2018).  
A good and concrete example of what personal data is processed by a mobile 
banking channel is offered by Nordea. According to their site, Nordea Mobile Bank 
application processes account details, payment data, name and account details of 
financial contacts and IP addresses in order for a customer to be able to perform 
banking services and for securing transactions e.g. criminal investigations (The 
processing of personal data in Mobile Bank app, 2018). In addition, Data Protection 
Working Party (2017b, 11) provides another example in the context of portability 
stating that a data subject’s bank account can contain personal data relating to the 
transactions. In addition, basic contact details are typically available, such as official 
name, postal address, email address and telephone number.  
Data Controller refers to the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means 
of processing personal data (ibid, 33), which in this context is a financial institution 
offering services to customers - the data subjects. Data Processor, means a natural or 
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legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data 
on behalf of the controller (ibid, 33) and is an outsourcing partner of a financial 
institution providing online banking self-service channels on behalf of the financial 
institution. Supervisory Authority refers to an independent public authority 
established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51 (ibid, 35).   
In addition to personal data, financial institutions and their outsourcing partners may 
process data known to be under banking secrecy. In Finland bank secrecy covers all 
non-public information that can be deemed to be of such nature that a customer or 
prospect customer wants to keep it confidential including the information whether a 
person is customer of the bank (Finanssialan Keskusliitto 2009, 1). Banking secrecy is 
provisioned in Finnish Credit Institutions Act. Banking secrecy predominantly 
addresses the security of personal data within a bank in terms of confidentiality 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers AG. 2017, 7). Data protection legislation goes beyond 
preventing the disclosure of personal data and governs the processing of personal 
data, provides rights to data subjects and confers duties on data controllers and 
processors (ibid, 7). 
8.3 Outsourcing services processing personal data 
EU General Data Protection Regulation imposes a number of requirements under 
Article 28 for controllers appointing service providers, which process personal data, 
including prescribing various matters which must be set out in form of a contract or 
other legal act. (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 
49). Processor may process the personal data only on documented instructions from 
the controller (ibid., 49). 
A principal requirement for a controller is to use only processors providing sufficient 
guarantees; in particular, in terms of expert knowledge, reliability and resources to 
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to comply with the 
regulation and to ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject (ibid., 49). To 
come up with such assurance, controller’s due diligence should cover making of an 
assessment of each processor prior to entering into a processing agreement.   
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Sufficient guarantee could be demonstrated by a processor with help of code of 
conduct or certification (ibid., 56), which can be assessed by a body with appropriate 
level of subject-matter expertise and is accredited for that purpose by the competent 
supervisory authority (ibid., 58). At the time of writing of the thesis, there were 
neither code of conducts nor certifications available for EU GDPR. According to Pierre 
Chastanet (2017), Deputy Head of Unit Cybersecurity & Digital Privacy in the 
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology of the 
European Commission, there are two codes of conduct submitted to Working Party 
("WP29" – the Committee of national Data Protection Authorities) in the domain of 
cloud service providers and cloud infrastructure service providers; however, neither 
of them have been approved by Working Party ("WP29" – the Committee of national 
Data Protection Authorities). The progress appears slow considering that the first 
draft of the code of conduct on Data Protection for Cloud Service Providers was 
submitted in January 2015. 
8.4 Subcontracting services processing personal data 
The processor shall not engage another processor without prior specific or general 
written authorization of the controller if subcontracting also concerns processing of 
personal data. In the case of general written authorization, the processor shall 
inform the controller of any intended changes concerning the addition or 
replacement of other processors, thereby giving the controller the opportunity to 
object to such changes. (ibid.,49). EBA final draft level Guidelines on Outsourcing to 
Cloud is more flexible by requiring ex-ante notification to the outsourcing institution, 
whose consent, however, is not required (EBA 2017b, 6). Both undertaking controller 
and cloud service provider should have a shared understanding of which regulatory 
contexts are applied to which parts of outsourced services in case notification and 
approval processes differ depending on the service context. 
8.5 Transfer of personal data to third countries outside the EU/EEA 
The transfer of personal data to third countries outside the EU/EEA is a special case 
under EU GDPR and has a set of requirements of its own and is subject to the 
Commission’s adequacy decision. However, in the absence of an adequacy decision, 
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transfers are also allowed outside non-EU states under certain circumstances, such 
as by use of standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules, where controller 
or processor has provided appropriate safeguards, and on the condition that 
enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are 
available (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 62). 
Model contracts available at European Commission site, can be incorporated into a 
contract between two controllers or controller and processors assuming the main 
contract does not contradict with standard contractual clauses (European Council. 
Model Contracts for the transfer of personal data to third countries). 
8.6 Scope of EU GDPR requirements from perspective of ISO 
27001:2013, ISO 29100:2011 and ISO 27018:2015 
8.6.1 ISO 27001:2013 
EU GDPR Article 5 principle for processing personal data in a manner that 
appropriate security of personal data is ensured (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union 2016, 35) and Article 32 stating the controller and the 
processor shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate 
(ibid., 51) stands for all of the 114 control objectives of ISO 27001:2013 by the terms 
of the standard. In fact, EU GDPR text refers to certification mechanisms in general 
and speaks on behalf of using one by stating the Member States, the supervisory 
authorities, the Board, and the Commission shall encourage the establishment of 
data protection certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks, for 
the purpose of demonstrating compliance with this Regulation (ibid., 58).  
However, by applying principles of data minimization and privacy by design, and 
reducing the number of personal data repositories in use, financial institutions can 
optimize the amount of effort required to apply security controls and objectives in 
different solution areas. In the context of online banking channels this could 
primarily mean, that the channel solutions as such are stateless by design and only 
rely on information sources and log to a centralized security information and event 
management (SIEM) system. 
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8.6.2 ISO/IEC 27018:2014 and ISO 29100:2011 
International ISO/IEC 27018:2014 standard establishes commonly accepted control 
objectives, controls and guidelines for implementing measures to protect Personally 
Identifiable Information in accordance with the privacy principles in ISO/IEC 29100 
for the public cloud computing environment (ISO [ISO/IEC 27018:2014] 2014).  
There is a strong correlation between EU GDPR privacy principles and those available 
at ISO/IEC 29100, which have been published a few years before the text of EU GDPR 
was agreed upon as can be seen in Table 2. However, ISO-IEC 27018:2014 as such 
does not cover e.g. breach notification in given 72 hour timeline or necessarily limit 
data transfer outside EEA although locations of processing are specified. 
 
Table 2. Mapping of ISO 27018:2015 controls to EU GDPR privacy principles 
ISO 27018:2015 controls 
& ISO 29100 privacy 
principles 
EU GDPR article summary 
A.1 Consent and choice 
A.2 Purpose legitimacy 
and specification 
A.3 Collection limitation 
A.4 Data minimization 
A.5 Use, retention and 
disclosure limitation 
A.6 Accuracy and quality  
A.7 Openness, 
transparency and notice 
A.9 Accountability 
A.10 Information 
security 
Articles 5-7, 12, 13, 14 
Purpose limitation 
 
Lawfulness, fairness and transparency 
 
Storage limitation 
Data minimization 
Accuracy 
 
 
 
Accountability 
Integrity and confidentiality 
A.10.11 Contract 
measures 
Article 28 
A.11 Privacy compliance Article 15 Right of access by the data subject  
Article 16 Right to rectification 
Article 17 Right to erasure   
Article 18 Right to restriction of processing 
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Article 19 Notification obligation regarding rectification or  erasure 
of personal data or restriction of processing  
Article 20 Right to data portability 
Articles 21-22 Right to object and automated individual decision-
making 
 
9 Outsourcing to cloud and regulatory compliance 
9.1 Motivation for proper supplier management 
The following examples include some important lessons learned, which have drawn 
attention of supervisory authorities and news media; however, it is by no means a 
comprehensive list of public references. 
Nasdaq Clearing had outsourced to the Group’s parent company. However, this 
agreement did not contain any detailed descriptions of the relevant services or 
established Service Level Agreements. Furthermore, the company has not had access 
to information about threats, personnel situations, incident management, ongoing 
projects or training in cyber security. Neither has there been any information about 
threats related to Sweden or the Nordic region. Finansinspektionen issued a fine of 
30.000.000,00 and 25.000.000,00 SEK to Nasdaq Stockholm Aktiebolag and Nasdaq 
Clearing Aktiebolag in 2016 due to improper outsourcing management and 
performance monitoring. (Finansinspektionen. 2016b, 5). 
Some evidence of issues referring to interest in using standard cloud service and 
contracts is reported by Finansinpektionen (SWE-FSA) in its annual report from 2016; 
however, neither sources nor service providers are mentioned (Finansinspektionen. 
2016a, 15-16). According to EBA (European Banking Authority 2017a, 15), the 
outsourcing institution should ensure that the contractual arrangements do not 
impede its competent authority to carry out its supervisory function and objectives 
e.g. by means of restricting access rights and right to audit the cloud service provider. 
In 2015, Swedish Transport Agency outsourced their IT-services to IBM Sweden. The 
contract process was speeded up bypassing some laws and internal procedures 
34 
 
 
resulting in having people abroad without proper security clearance, handling servers 
with sensitive materials (Reuters 2017). According to Stefan Lofven, Swedish Prime 
Minister, his country and its citizens were exposed to risks by potential leaks of 
sensitive material. Maria Agren, a former director-general of the transport agency, 
was fired in January for undisclosed reasons and was fined for 70,000 SEK for being 
careless with secret information (Financial Times 2017). 
9.2 Overview of outsourcing guidelines 
There are three key guidelines published by European Banking Authority (EBA) from 
the outsourcing, outsourcing to cloud and ICT outsourcing risk management 
perspective.  
EBA SREP guideline is intended to promote common procedures and methodologies 
for the assessment of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) risk 
under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (European Banking Authority 
2017b, 3). The guideline is meant for the guidance of competent authorities but can 
be used in reverse, e.g. to internally validate if there is proper governance framework 
in place to among other things  implement ICT strategy, and management body is 
capable of addressing the risk associated with the ICT (see ibid., 15). SREP guideline 
provides also an annex (see ibid., 32-37) of risk categories, risks and examples, which 
can be considered as financial institution’s own risk assessment.  
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors’ Outsourcing guideline (2006) 
describes general provisions for outsourcing covering due diligence, contract, SLA, 
contingency and exit planning, and according to CEBS, e.g. in order to promote 
greater consistency of approach in EU where possible 
within the national legal frameworks (Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
2006, 1). The guideline has been totally transposed by 54% and 38% partially within 
EU member states (EBA 2017a, 21).  
Finally, the main objective of the guideline Recommendations on Outsourcing to 
Cloud Service Providers under Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (European 
Banking Authority 2017a, 22) is to:  
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Specify a set of principle-based rules that complement and update the 
CEBS guidelines for competent authorities to apply in their regulatory 
and supervisory framework for the cloud outsourcing process and the 
associated risks 
The recommendations for outsourcing in cloud highlights that many of the provisions 
set in CEBS are still effective also in cloud, but makes a few revisions excluding 
requirement of prior consent in case changes to subcontracting and by enabling 
pooled audits (European Banking Authority 2017a, 24).  
It is good to remember, that these guidelines directly refer to other regulatory 
contexts as well, such as data protection. Table 3 illustrates the key outsourcing 
guidelines, their primary target audience and application date.   
 
Table 3. List of compliance guidelines and effective dates 
Author and guideline Primary target 
audience 
Secondary or indirect 
audience 
Effective date 
EBA - 
Guidelines on ICT 
Risk Assessment 
under the 
Supervisory Review 
and Evaluation 
process (SREP)  
competent 
authorities, auditors 
financial institutions  1.1.2018 
EBA - 
Guidelines on 
outsourcing to cloud 
competent 
authorities , financial 
institutions, auditors 
cloud service 
providers 
June-2018 
EBA - CEBS 
outsourcing 
guidelines 
competent 
authorities , financial 
institutions, auditors 
outsourcing service 
providers 
2006 
Finanssivalvonta -  
Ulkoistaminen 
rahoitussektoriin 
kuuluvissa 
valvottavissa 
financial institutions, 
auditors 
outsourcing service 
providers 
2012 
 
Finansinspektionen’s 
Regulations and 
General Guidelines 
regarding 
information security, 
IT operations and 
deposit 
systems 
financial institutions, 
auditors 
outsourcing service 
providers 
2014 
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It is expected that Finansinspektionen will publish more instructions soon. SWE-FSA 
has announced “EBA will shortly publish EU common cloud services guidelines. FI has 
participated in that work and plans to return further guidance with reference to 
these guidelines.” (Finansinspektionen, 2017b). 
9.3 Short history of outsourcing regulations 
The current guideline on outsourcing for banks and investment institutions is from 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) predecessor, European 
Banking Authority and dates back to 2006, the same year when Amazon launched its 
Elastic Compute cloud (EC2), which allowed companies and individuals to rent 
scalable computing capacity. According to Baker McKenzie (2017, 2006 CEBS 
Guidelines), the volume of financial information, data and demand for outsourcing to 
cloud service providers has increased substantially since then.  
Keeping in mind the evolution of cloud computing during the past decade and the 
fact that EBA has not made any distinction between outsourcing and outsourcing to 
cloud, it comes as a no surprise there is a high level of uncertainty regarding the 
regulatory provisions, forming an obstacle in the adoption of cloud services 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 5). The major benefits from establishing a 
common European framework for outsourcing are reduction in operational risk, level 
playing field across competing institutions in regards to regulative burden and 
supervisory convergence (ibid., 24).  
The final report on recommendations on cloud outsourcing has some eight pages of 
recommendations excluding from the count any background information, executive 
summary, rationale and accompanying documents, which means the paper’s core 
content is relative short and easy to read through, although there are plenty of 
references to CEBS guideline, which should be considered as a supplementary 
document for outsourcing in general. More effort is required to internalize the 
obligations and cost elements in it in depth and the relationship to information 
security overall – what is in the focus area and what is not directly touched upon. The 
outline of the content of the paper is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Outline of the draft recommendation on outsourcing to cloud (taken from 
presentation of European Banking Authority at public hearing 20.06.2017) 
 
9.4 ICT outsourcing risks and risk profile factors 
To understand in-depth the compliance requirements set by European Banking 
Authority, one approach is to understand the risk profiles, risk categories and threat 
landscape having a prudential impact. By average, some 20 online banking incidents 
occurred in Finland, which were reported during years 2013 and 2014 (YLE 2015). 
The overall number of disturbances reported to Finanssivalvonta (FIN-FSA) is much 
higher and was on the level of 122-155 on a yearly basis between 2013 and 2015 (YLE 
2016). Markku Koponen from Finanssivalvonta states in the same article that Finnish 
bank’s online channels are reliable. It is typical, that any disturbances noticeable to 
end customers concerning online banking channels are newsworthy, which increases 
the criticality of the channel services. 
European Banking Authority Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment under the 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation process (SREP) set out the requirements, that the 
competent authorities should apply in their assessment of ICT focusing on the 
general provisions and application of scoring as part of the SREP assessment of risks 
to capital, assessment of institutions’ governance and strategy on ICT and 
assessment of institutions’ ICT risk exposures and controls. (EBA 2017b, 3). These 
38 
 
 
guidelines include also assessing the risks related to ICT outsourcing. The material 
related to ICT outsourcing can be found helpful to validate if certain risk scenarios 
have been thought of and their criticality level of ICT systems and services classified. 
SREP introduces its own risk taxonomy for authorities as a step forward in 
establishing a link between the concepts and concerns of complex, detailed and 
highly technical IT audit frameworks, e.g. Cobit, CMMI and ISO, and the guidelines 
EBA offers (EBA 2017b, 46 ). EBA justifies its approach that the standards are little 
known and understood by non-IT experts and there is demand for more practical and 
intuitive language and thinking frameworks by supervisors. Financial institutions 
have the freedom to maintain their own risk taxonomies (ibid., 76). 
9.5 Definition of critical ICT system or service 
SREP has a definition for a critical ICT systems and services also referring to the 
context of this thesis. According to the guideline (EBA 2017b, 20), ICT system or 
service is critical if they support: 
core business operations and distribution channels (e.g. ATMs, internet 
and mobile banking), essential governance processes and corporate 
functions (e.g. risk management and treasury), they fall under special 
legal or regulatory requirements, they process or store confidential or 
sensitive data to which unauthorized access could significantly impact 
(e.g. databases), they provide vital base line functionalities (e.g. 
telecom, connectivity, ICT and cyber security services). 
In light of this definition, a single online banking channel in a multi-channel 
environment would not be considered critical because of having the role of 
complementing service channel. A single channel has neither significance from 
shared core or baseline functionality point of view assuming there are no cross-
dependencies between the online channels. However, an online banking channel for 
authenticated customers typically does process confidential or sensitive data. 
Unauthorized access could have significant reputational and regulatory impact. 
Execution of fraudulent payment transactions by hackers through the breaking or 
circumvention of the security of e-banking and payment services and/or by attacking 
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and exploiting security vulnerabilities in the internal payment systems of the 
institution was given as a related ICT security risk in ICT Risk Taxonomy Annex (EBA 
2017b, 33). Due to reputational impacts and the risk profile, internet and mobile 
banking channels should be considered material and critical ICT systems by 
definition. 
Assuming the channels were operated from a single operative environment, the 
online banking channel could have common dependencies between all the customer-
facing channels, which would also be interpreted as critical due to serving core 
business operations and distribution channels. An example implementation of this 
type of component could be an enterprise service bus providing e.g. message 
transformation services and service APIs for surrounding system landscape. 
9.6 ICT outsourcing risks 
The introduction of a white paper by Haller and Wallen (2016, 1) describes that 
outsourcing to third parties and the resulting dependency risks have become a 
leading consideration for financial services firms, drawing extensive management 
attention and regulatory scrutiny. Attackers know that third party suppliers can be a 
weak link and target them to gain foothold on infrastructure of a financial institution 
(ibid., 1). 
SREP guidelines acknowledge this type of scenario within ICT outsourcing risk 
category illustrated in Figure 5. The list is stated not to be exhaustive, but aims to 
bring about a uniform understanding of risk categories and facilitate a common 
language (EBA 2017b, 76). Some level of emphasis should be given to the examples 
that ended up in the annex, regardless of the fact that these guideline documents are 
not necessarily meant to be correlated against each other. It should be fair to say, 
that for the sake of consistency and focusing resources effectively, the risk 
categories, risk descriptions and examples should be the primary concerns of both 
authorities and financial institutions.  
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Figure 5. ICT outsourcing risk taxonomy of SREP (European Banking Authority 2017b, 
37) 
The risks named in the Annex of the guidelines (ibid., 37) cover service resiliency, 
outsourcing governance and information security. The outsourcing to cloud 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 16) in Chapter 4.5 and CEBS guidelines 
(Committee of European Banking Supervisors 2006, 6) address resiliency only by 
stating that institutions should implement arrangements to ensure the continuity of 
the services provided by the outsourcing service provider. The accuracy and 
concreteness level of audit guideline is more fine-grained than the actual set 
requirements. The same issue continues with change management and malicious 
insiders, which are identified as example risks but are not referred directly at all in 
the outsourcing guideline. 
In addition to outsourcing risks, there are risk categories, which are relevant from the 
online banking context point of view, and which directly refer to e-banking, such as: 
ICT availability and continuity risks including distributed denial of service against e-
banking services; ICT security risks, and e.g. circumvention of security of e-banking 
and payment services for execution of fraudulent payment or securities transactions 
(European Banking Authority 2017b, 32-33). 
9.7 Outsourcing and cloud delivery models 
In the draft version of the EBA recommendation, definitions were given to cloud 
services, public, community, hybrid, private cloud and IaaS, PaaS and SaaS delivery 
models (see European Banking Authority 2017a, 10-11), which are introduced in the 
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context of requirement of having a registry including the information of the type of 
cloud and its delivery model (ibid., 13). The fact that there was no reference to 
commonly used definitions such as NIST or a distinction between cloud service 
provider and resource operator was criticized by Temenos, a financial service 
company based in Switzerland, in its reply to the consultation paper (Temenos 2017, 
1-2). The lack of further reference to types of cloud or cloud delivery models suggest 
the types and models are treated as equal as long as all requirements are met 
including the ones touching upon chain outsourcing and subcontracting.  
Finansinpektionen has stated in its yearly report from 2016 (Finansinspektionen 
2016a, 15) that it does not make a distinction between outsourcing to cloud and 
traditional forms of outsourcing to an IT supplier. It is up to the company risk 
management to evaluate and make sure the information security risks are under 
control (ibid, 15). In comparison of Finansinspektionen’s statement from 2016 with 
EBA’s new recommendation on outsourcing to cloud, the latter will provide more 
practical and hands-on approach to outsource contracting on cloud trying to ensure 
that financial institutions consider the most common pitfalls from risk management 
point of view. 
9.8 Content analysis of recommendation on outsourcing to cloud 
service providers 
The following chapter describes the approach taken to understand the requirements 
outlined in the recommendation in depth. A process description was done from both 
financial institution and supplier perspectives based on the information given in the 
outsourcing guideline to illustrate the effort and regular activities required in the 
compliance process.  
To summarize the recommendations, ISO-IEC 27001 reference control objectives and 
controls list was used to gain understanding to which categories the requirements of 
the recommendation fall into in an information security system. In practice all of the 
requirements could be primarily classified under Compliance (A.18) control due to 
originating from an authority. However, the latter approach, where all the 
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requirements are classified under compliance, would not bring any further insight in 
which security domains and control objectives should be considered.  
The auditing guidelines of SREP for competent authorities were compared against 
the requirements for outsourcing institutions. Even though the publisher is the same 
entity (European Banking Authority), inconsistencies between expectations were 
identified. 
9.8.1 Summarization and classification of outsourcing requirements 
The summarization in Appendix 1 is done from the perspective of a financial 
institution, therefore requirements from 10 to 13 were opted out. In total, there 
were 23 unique requirements for financial institutions, four (4) for cloud service 
providers and four (4) as well for competent authorities. Requirement number 15 
counted as two separate requirements, which are directly overlapping with 
provisions already set in CEBS Guideline. Requirement number 4 and 5 were joined 
due to number five (5) only providing clarifications to the previous one. The 
consistency of numbering of the requirements in the draft version of the 
recommendations still seems to be under work. Figure 6 illustrates the number of 
requirements in each category of ISO-IEC 27001 reference control objectives and 
controls; most of the requirements fall under supplier relationships category. 
 
 
Figure 6. Outsourcing to cloud requirement categorization 
Information security policies (A.5)
Human resource security (A.7)
Access control (A.9)
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Table 4 below illustrates the forms, in which the outputs or evidence of the activities 
required from a financial institution by European Banking Authority could be 
described based on cites from EBA recommendations. 
Table 4. Outputs and evidence of compliance required by EBA recommendation on 
outsourcing to cloud service providers based on interpretation 
Document  Requirement Definition Evidence or success 
criteria 
Materiality 
assessment 
Requirement 1, 
Chapter 4.2 
To demonstrate 
financial institution 
has understood the 
risk impacts from 
business perspectives 
and considered  
Analysis of items from 
1A to 1D of the 
guideline covered in 
the documentation  
Outsourcing register Requirement 4, 
Chapter 4.2 
Register with 
information related to 
all its material and 
non-material 
outsourced activities 
at institution and 
group level 
Information requested 
in requirement 3 and 
4 available and 
documented per 
request by NFSA 
 
Contingency and exit 
plan 
Requirement 26, 
Chapter 4.8 
Contingency planning 
and clearly defined 
exit plan 
 
Documented, 
sufficiently tested 
Transition plan Requirement 27 b, 
Chapter 4.8 
Identify alternative 
solutions and develop 
transition plans to be 
able to remove and 
transfer existing 
activities and data 
from the CSP to these 
solutions 
Documented, 
sufficiently tested in a 
controlled way taking 
into account data 
location issues and 
maintain business 
continuity during the 
transition phase 
Outsourcing contract Requirement 15, 
Chapter 4.5 
  
Service Level 
Agreement 
Requirement 15, 
Chapter 4.5 
  
Internal or 3rd party 
audit report 
Requirement 8, 
Chapter 4.3 
 Audit report 
Certification by 3rd 
party 
Requirement 8, 
Chapter 4.3 
 Audit report 
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9.8.2 Changes to outsourcing requirements introduced by cloud 
recommendations 
In comparison to the previous outsourcing guideline by CEBS, the new version by 
European Banking Authority, there are a few new requirements extending the basic 
scope of more traditional outsourcing context.  
One of these is the requirement for the outsourcing institution to maintain an 
updated register of information on all its material and non-material activities that are 
outsourced to cloud service providers at institutional and group level, including 
information of description of the activities and data to be outsourced, applicable law 
governing the contract and the country or countries where the service is to be 
performed (European Banking Authority 2017a, 12).  
By definition in CEBS (CEBS 2006, 2-3) guideline, material activities have such an 
importance that: 
 any  weakness or failure in the provision of these activities could have 
a significant effect on the financial institution’s ability to meet its regulatory 
responsibilities and/or to continue in business, 
 any other activities requiring a license from the supervisory authority, 
 any activities having a significant impact on its risk management, 
 and the management of risks related to these activities. 
 
Where an outsourcing institution does not employ its own audit resources, it can 
consider using new tools such as pooled audits or third-party certifications, third 
party or internal audit reports made available by the cloud service provider 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 14). This can help financial organizations to get 
synergies from previous auditing efforts and burden the cloud service providers less. 
Prior consent is no longer required for changes in subcontracting, though the 
outsourcing institution and the cloud service provider should specify any types of 
activities excluded from potential subcontracting and indicate that the cloud service 
provider retains full responsibility for and oversight of those services that it has 
subcontracted (European Banking Authority 2017a, 17). There are also more details 
on requirements to make a risk assessment in case of changes to subcontracting 
based on information received from a CSP and requirement to monitor outsourcing 
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performance regardless of whether the service or parts of it are provided by the 
cloud service provider or its subcontractors (ibid., 18).  
In addition, the recommendations include guidance implementing adequate controls 
and measures on the data security in risk based manner, such as the use of 
encryption technologies for data in transit, data in memory and data at rest (ibid., 3). 
However, considering that similar expectations are already set by European Data 
Protection Regulation, this should not introduce an additional cost element for the 
financial institutions. 
9.8.3 Costs incurring from outsourcing to cloud recommendations 
This chapter describes the direct cost elements of post-contractual phases of 
outsourcing recommendations. There are also indirect costs from decision making, 
due diligence checks on cloud service provider, requirement setting and contract 
negotiations, which are considered to belong to pre-contractual or contractual 
phases.  
There are two types of competence related cost elements present in the guidelines, 
in addition to understanding of outsourcing and compliance issues in the type of 
arrangements in general, assessing risks and maintaining the skills and resources 
necessary to adequately monitor the outsourced activities. 
CEBS guideline, which should be read in conjunction with outsourcing to cloud 
recommendations, state that outsourcing institutions should retain adequate core 
competence in-house at a senior operational level to enable them to have the 
capability to resume direct control over an outsourced activity in an extreme 
situation (CEBS 2006, 3). 
Considering the high level of technical complexity of cloud solutions, the outsourcing 
institution should verify that the staff performing the audit, or the staff reviewing the 
third-party certification or service provider’s audit reports, have acquired the right 
skills and knowledge to perform effective and relevant audits and/or assessments of 
cloud solutions (European Banking Authority 2017a, 14-15).  
Testing of exit strategy is required by European Banking Authority, where 
appropriate, whether it is in the form desktop exercise, live testing or some other 
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form, can have a cost impact especially if any third parties are involved in testing 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 68).  
 In addition to competences, there are process level cost elements related to risk 
management, keeping and maintaining cloud outsourcing registry, auditing or 
assessing available audit reports by CSP, monitoring of SLA and key performance 
indicators as well as management of an outsourcing arrangement including following 
up the changes affecting the outsourcing service provider, e.g. major change in 
ownership, strategies, profitability of operations. 
Finally, the outsourcing contract itself might introduce some additional fees which 
are not part of standard service but are required to have privileged audit and access 
rights for contractual compliance. 
9.9 Outsourcing to cloud and supplier management processes 
The process description of risk management prior to outsourcing agreement of a 
financial institution could be illustrated as Figure 7 based on SREP Controls for 
managing material ICT outsourcing risks (European Banking Authority 2017b, 29) and 
chapter 4.1 of Recommendations on outsourcing to cloud service providers 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 12). 
It could be claimed that the critical success path is to ensure a level of information 
security and outsourcing knowledge, produce the information or evidence in form of 
documents required by relevant outsourcing recommendation, engage supervisory 
authority from the start to validate the plans and documents, draft and sign a 
contract considering compliance obligations and follow-up the delivery of service by 
means of performance and risk monitoring.  
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Figure 7. Outsourcing to cloud and supplier management processes 
 
The recommendations or requirements can yet be categorized to three stages: 1. 
steps to carry out prior outsourcing standing for material assessment and ex-ante 
notification; 2. commercial negotiations to ensure contractual obligations; 3. 
performance and risk monitoring and continuous improvement during continuous 
service phase. The three-staged process illustrated by EBA can be seen in Figure 8. 
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This illustration does not dive into implementing the actual service setup by cloud 
service provider based on security and data protection obligations. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Three phases of outsourcing (taken from presentation of European Banking 
Authority at public hearing 20.06.2017) 
 
10 Compliance solution architecture 
10.1 Overview 
The compliance solution architecture proposed by this thesis consists of collections 
of controls and principles from different concreteness level of regulations, 
provisions, guidelines, recommendations, although those documents are typically 
principle-based rather than contain detailed requirements in order to avoid the need 
for constant updating.  
It is, however, noteworthy that there can be gaps in the type and depth of controls, 
which are identified by outsourcing or data protection related documents from 
European Council and European Banking Authority, in comparison to industry best 
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practices. For example, the depth of controls hardly ever reaches the level of 
application software like OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS). 
In overall, as suggested also in the introduction chapter, the compliance architecture 
of online banking self-service channels could consist of capabilities and artifacts such 
as: 
 contracts, 
 information security and outsourcing or service management processes, 
 technical architecture and capabilities, 
 and skills and knowledge for operating the service context. 
 
The sub-chapters cover more of the  
 principles having impact on type of security controls required,  
 non-functional requirements for the architecture, 
 functional requirements for online bankin channels, 
 and contractual requirements supported by automated capabilities to produce SLA 
reporting.  
 
The process level requirements are covered in Chapter 10 where risk management is 
one of the focus areas. Knowledge and skill related requirements have not been 
specified in the thesis. 
10.2 Security principles  
10.2.1 Data privacy by design and by default 
Both European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2016, 6) and 
ISO/IEC29100 (2011, 9) embrace the concept of Privacy by Design meaning reducing 
the risk of collecting unsolicited PII by considering privacy safeguarding measures 
starting at the time of the design of the system throughout the entire information life 
cycle end-to-end.  
Such measures could consist, among other things, of minimizing the processing 
of personal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon as possible, 
transparency of the functions and processing of personal data, enabling the 
data subject to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller to create 
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and improve security features. (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union 2016, 15). 
The definition of Privacy by Design is not just about adoption and integration of 
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) type of elements but spans to a variety of 
settings of application covering from information technology to business practices, 
physical design and infrastructures (European Commission, 2018). 
To be able to demonstrate, that data privacy by design and by default is embedded in 
line with the principle of accountability in Article 5 (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union 2016, 36) into the design, operation and management 
of a given system landscape forming a set of business processes, certification can be 
seen as effective and practical approach unless considered as a founding 
requirement.  
10.2.2 Lawfulness, fairness, transparency and purpose limitation of personal 
data 
EU GDPR requires, that personal data of a data subject shall be processed lawfully, 
fairly and in a transparent manner, collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a manner incompatible with those purposes 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 35).  
10.2.3 Accuracy of personal data 
EU GDPR requires, that personal data of a data subject shall be accurate and, where 
necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that 
personal data that are inaccurate, regard to the purposes for which they are 
processed, are erased or rectified without delay (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union 2016, 35).  
10.2.4 Data minimization 
Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which it 
is collected and/or further processed (European Parliament and the Council of the 
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European Union 2016, 35). Even though many of the interactions between online 
banking channels and dependency systems typically lead to exchange of more data 
than is required by the end user process, not all the data is relevant to be stored by 
the online banking channel. In fact, the context should be understood only as a 
gateway for processing the data, not as a master in terms of data persistence, which 
means there is an emphasis on securing the data exchange between the channel and 
dependency systems such as identity and access management system, customer 
relationship management (CRM), core banking (accounts, loans), security 
information and event management (SIEM), web analytics, customer messaging and 
so forth. 
10.2.5 Principle of least privilege and security in depth 
According to EBA Guidelines on ICT risk under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
process under the controls for managing material ICT security risk, the assessment of 
competent authorities should validate if a financial institution’s ICT security policy 
takes into account the principle of least privilege (i.e. limiting access to the minimal 
level that will allow normal functioning for access right management) and principle of 
defense in depth, which stands for layered security mechanisms increasing security 
of the system as a whole for designing a security architecture. (European Banking 
Authority 2017b, 27).  
10.2.6 Segregation of duties 
Financial institution’s risk control framework should consider specifications regarding 
the required segregation of duties during the different phases of the implemented 
ICT change processes with a focus on the implemented solutions and segregation of 
duties to manage and control changes to the production ICT systems and data by ICT 
staff or any other party (European Banking Authority 2017b, 28).  
10.2.7 Right to audit 
The right to audit is a key right laid down in the principles of the CEBS guidelines 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 6). To reduce the manual effort, involvement 
and need for a physical access during audit, the system should support logical access 
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and virtual audit of the data for the financial institution and supervising authority.  
Because of the fact that outsourcing institutions have the flexibility to exercise these 
rights in a risk-based manner by e.g. relying on third-party audit reports or 
certifications according to EBA (European Banking Authority 2017a, 47), certification 
against a well-known standard can be seen as a method to streamline and reduce 
costs of auditing. 
10.3 Data anonymisation, pseudonymisation and tokenization 
techniques 
The following techniques are recognized by Data Protection Working Party (2014, 21) 
in terms of security measures enhancing data privacy illustrated in Figure 9 
describing whether 1) identification of an individual in the dataset 2) linking two 
records assigned to a same group of individuals but without capability to single out 
individuals 3) or the possibility to deduce a value of an attribute from the values of a 
set of other attributes in dataset, is still possible after use of corresponding 
technique. It is worth mentioning that each of these techniques fail to meet with 
certainty the criteria of effective anonymization, i.e. processing of personal data in 
order to irreversibly prevent identification. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Techniques Considered (Data Protection 
Working Party 2014, 24). 
 
 
Tokenization technique is typically applied but not limited to in the financial sector to 
replace card ID numbers by values with reduced usefulness for an attacker. The 
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values are typically derived by the use of one-way encryption mechanisms or the 
assignment, through an index function, of a sequence number or a randomly 
generated number that is not mathematically derived from the original data. (ibid, 
21). Another use case is to exchange user authentication or identification 
information during the login process to a technical customer-id, which is used to link 
customer data to the data subject, however, it is only known by the processing 
system and not shared with the data subject. This type of system design assumes 
customer-id is shared by all dependency systems, or those at least have the 
capability to make a subsequent call to exchange a tokenized id to an id recognized 
by the system.  Additional calls have a performance impact on overall system design. 
10.4 Portability in cloud outsourcing strategy 
As Dutch Banking Association (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken) suggests in its 
response to EBA consultation paper of draft recommendations on outsourcing to 
cloud service providers, it is important that financial institutions take responsibility 
and plan how they distribute their business critical systems. Having more than one 
cloud service provider and having bank critical applications able to run on multiple 
clouds at the same time may prove to be critical for their survival. (Dutch Banking 
Association, 2017). Looking at this from a different angle means a supplier or a cloud 
service provider of a financial institution should avoid use of solution components, 
which rely on technology introducing vendor-lock-in level dependencies. Portability 
can be seen as a good architectural design principle contributing to contingency 
planning and exit strategy. 
10.5 Resiliency in cloud 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA response to European Banking Agency consultation 
paper on outsourcing to cloud service providers, 2017) states that resilience can be 
achieved in many different ways e.g. by use of availability zones and the like in a 
single cloud provider context as well as architectures designed to be fault tolerant by 
consuming multiple CSP offerings across cloud providers beyond one SLA delivery 
promise. Cloud Security Alliance believes multi-sourcing of CSPs in combination with 
resilient architectures is the deployment model for systemically important services, 
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reducing concentration risk and making exiting a provider less disruptive due 
portability. Neither the outsourcing guidelines nor data protection regulation have 
any references to system resiliency from requirement setting point of view, instead 
outsourcing guideline embraces the topic on higher level by referring to business 
continuity overall. 
10.6  Security controls 
10.6.1 Intrusion detection, prevention and vulnerability management 
EBA Guidelines on ICT risk under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation process 
(European Banking Authority 2017b, 27) instruct competent authorities to assess the 
protection of critical ICT systems and services by seeking evidence of adoption of for 
example a vulnerability assessment process, software patch management, end point 
protection (e.g. malware virus), intrusion detection and prevention tools. In general, 
processes and solutions to secure websites and applications include a combination of 
recognized secure development practices, ICT system hardening and vulnerability 
scanning practices, implementation of additional security solutions such as 
application firewalls, intrusion detection (IDS) and/or intrusion prevention (IPS) 
systems (ibid., 28). 
10.6.2 Logging and reporting 
Financial institutions are expected to have controls for user and administrative 
activity logging part of managing material ICT security risks (European Banking 
Authority 2017b, 25). User and administrative activity logging serve the purpose of 
enabling effective monitoring and the timely detection and response to unauthorized 
activity, e.g. to assist in or to conduct forensic investigations of security incidents 
(European Banking Authority 2017a, 26).  
Neither outsourcing guidelines nor data protection regulation further elaborates the 
architecture for logging or how to protect audit logs from modification and to 
maintain integrity of the logs. However European Payments Council (2010), an 
international not-for-profit association and not a part of the European Union 
institutional framework, has published a comprehensive document of principles and 
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best practices for banks under title ‘The use of audit trails in security systems: 
guidelines for European banks’ in 2010.  
As this document is beyond the scope of this thesis, complete information about the 
50 principles introduced by the guideline are not addressed here, however, there are 
two principles worth mentioning here. According to EPC Principles 7 and 9, 
organizations should consider the use of a Security Event Management or SIEM 
system due to the large volume of security events (European Payments Council 2010, 
11). A system of this scale should be considered to be by nature a generic and shared 
component of enterprise’s architecture rather than limited to the architecture of 
online banking channels. Another important principle is to protect of the integrity of 
audit logs from any modification by e.g. signing the logs with digital signatures or by 
sending logs to write-once type of media (ibid., 14).  
10.6.3 Key management and data encryption 
There are only few architectural or technical requirements for financial institutions in 
the outsourcing guidelines, however, the one seen worth mentioning in the final 
draft version of outsourcing guideline to cloud is, that specific measures should be 
considered where necessary, such as the usage of encryption technologies in 
combination with appropriate key management architecture for data in transit, data 
in memory, and data at rest (European Banking Authority 2017a, 16).  
EBA has not refined the requirements any further but to protect against both an 
external breach of the service provider as well an attack originating from a privileged 
user or employee of the provider. For example Cloud Security Alliance (2012, 10) 
promotes the principle of segregation of duties and separating key management 
from the cloud provider hosting the data. In addition IBM’s (2017) reply to the 
consultation paper recommends, that whilst encryption remains an outsourcing 
institutions choice, the client should maintain independent control of the encryption 
keys.  
From online banking architecture’s point of view, the end user traffic must be 
secured over TLS connection even if outsourcing guidelines or EU GDPR use terms 
such as ‘where necessary’, ‘may’, ‘such as’ and ‘as appropriate’ indicating 
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encryption a security control, which is strongly advised but not enforced. OWASP 
(2017) strongly advices, that if the web application handling sensitive data may be 
the target of determined attackers, to use TLS services everywhere, whether the 
implementation is based on software library or a hardware device, provided by FIPS 
140-2 validated crypto modules adding a layer of physical security requirements over 
FIPS 140-1.  
Data protection in rest and in memory are more closely connected to capabilities and 
technologies being involved and offer less surface on discussing the topic from a 
broader perspective. It can be said that there are more COTS products for data at 
rest encryption, which can be implemented on e.g. a file system or natively on 
database engine level compared to available solutions for data in memory 
encryption. 
Data in memory encryption is by nature more tightly coupled with processor 
architecture. For example, AMD technology integrates the main memory encryption 
capabilities with virtualization architecture and can be used in both cloud and Docker 
type models. Solutions at this level are transparent to software. (Kaplan & Powell & 
Woller 2016, 2) 
10.6.4 Denial of service protection 
EBA Guidelines on ICT risk under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation process 
expects evidence of solutions to protect critical internet activities or services (e.g. e-
banking services) where necessary and appropriate, against denial of service attacks 
from the Internet, aimed at denying or disturbing access to these activities and 
services. (European Banking Authority 2017b, 26). 
10.7 Operationalizing of data subject rights 
10.7.1 Terms and conditions and consent management 
An online banking channel should have settings for data subject's acceptance of the 
proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or 
inactivity does not constitute a consent according to EU GDPR (European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union 2016, 6). The consent should be formulated 
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by the controller in an intelligible and easily accessible form using clear and plain 
language, and it should not contain unfair terms (ibid., 8). The data subjects should 
be made aware of risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of 
personal data and how to exercise their rights in relation to such processing (ibid., 7), 
which simply put means the data controllers must inform the data subjects about 
their different rights under the regulation. 
10.7.2 Settings for processing personal data for marketing  
In EU GDPR Article 21, data subject shall have the right to object at any time to 
processing of personal data for such marketing that includes profiling related to 
direct marketing. If objected, the personal data of the individual shall no longer be 
processed for such purposes. (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union 2016, 45). 
10.7.3 Restriction of processing 
EU Data Protection Regulation Article 21 states the data subject has the right to 
obtain restriction of processing from the controller when specific conditions are met 
such as the controller no longer needs the personal data for the purposes of the 
processing. However, they are required by the data subject for the establishment, 
exercise or defense of legal claims, or in case the accuracy of the personal data is 
contested by the data subject (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union. 2016, 45).  
This data subject right can be interpreted as if the Front Office channels, supporting 
the customer facing online banking channels, should have the option to flag an end 
customer with status of restriction of processing as well as restricting further 
processing of personal data until the restriction is lifted.  
10.7.4 Right to be forgotten and data portability 
With the assumption that the online banking channels are implemented stateless, 
there should be no need to have a far-fetched process for deleting customer data. 
However, in case there is some personal data stored, by minimum there should be an 
API that could interact with master exit process of customer of a financial institution.  
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The same applies to data portability except that online banking channels can be 
considered as the most convenient media for requesting and delivery of portable 
personal data in electronic format, e.g. account statements. 
10.8 Outsourcing contract and EU GDPR compliance 
As a due diligence requirement, EU Data Protection Regulation requires, the 
controller should use only processors providing sufficient guarantees, in particular in 
terms of expert knowledge, reliability and resources, to implement technical and 
organizational measures for the security of processing (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. 2016, 49). 
A written contract or other legal act stipulates that the processor processes the 
personal data only on documented instructions from the controller that applies as 
well to transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organization 
(ibid., 49). 
10.9 Service level reporting 
Outsourced service architecture must technically implement the quality and 
performance criteria metrics measured on agreed intervals and with history of 
review period correlating with what was written onto outsourcing contracts and 
about agreed service levels. Service level agreement (SLA) describes the minimum 
expected level of service and set of key performance indicators to be followed during 
the outsourcing contract implementation. Quality and performance criteria should 
also cover security for a financial institution to be able to monitor and manage the 
risks associated with its outsourcing arrangements on on-going basis. (European 
Banking Authority 2017a, 16).  
Typical key performance indicators (KPI) for an online service is service availability 
and response time per agreed time unit, which have direct impact on end-user 
experience. The PKIs should be aligned with the strategic objectives of the company. 
Table 5 outlines examples of PKIs for banks to be considered as part of an SLA by 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2014) that published a document intended 
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to serve as a resource for banks in addressing specific challenges relating to 
technology outsourcing.   
Table 5: Examples of SLA objectives, requirements and measurements (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 2014, 6). 
 
 
11  Compliance risks and business blockers of cloud adoption 
and for cloud architecture  
11.1 Insufficient knowledge of outsourcing to cloud and auditing 
Outsourcing a material service to a third party is a risk from multiple perspectives in 
case the outsourcing party does not have sufficient competence and understanding 
of the requirements from contracting to the full lifecycle of the outsourcing deal. 
Competences and knowledge are required from outsourcing contracting, outsourcing 
compliance, (cloud) technologies, due diligence, auditing, risk assessment and service 
steering and monitoring. EBA recommendation considers whether the outsourcing 
institution maintains the skills and resources necessary to adequately monitor the 
outsourced activities (EBA 2017a, 13), or if the organization’s staff has acquired the 
right skills and knowledge to perform effective and relevant audits and/or 
assessments of cloud solutions (ibid., 15). Further CEBS outsourcing guideline expects 
an organization to retain adequate core competence at a senior operational level in 
house to have the capability to resume direct control over an outsourced activity 
(CEBS 2006, 3). 
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11.1 Processing of data outside EU jurisdiction and power of European 
banking supervisory 
According to EBA, institutions should take special care when entering into and 
managing outsourcing agreements undertaken outside the EEA because of possible 
data protection risks and risks to effective supervision by the supervisory authority 
(EBA 2017a, 17). Risk could realize in case outsourcing is agreed to take place under 
jurisdiction, where effective supervision by the supervisory authority is blocked. 
11.2 Failure to contractually assure full rights of access and audit for 
both institutions and competent authorities 
Regardless of the fact that large cloud service providers are seen reluctant to co-
operate with granting the type of audit and access rights demanded by the 
recommendation, European Banking Authority is unwilling to make exceptions in its 
requirement of assuring the contractual rights for both institutions and competent 
authorities. Based on summarization of all the 37 responses submitted to draft 
recommendation consultation process, the concerns of securing the sufficient audit 
and access rights are illustrated in Figure 10. A single response can contain none or 
multiple aspects of concerns and can equal a higher figure than 37 in total. The 
summarization is based on information collected in Appendix 3.  
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Figure 10: obstacles for getting full audit and access rights among EBA consultancy 
paper respondents 
 
 
According to EBA (European Banking Authority 2017a, 47-48), in addition to physical 
access to the business premises of the cloud service provider, right of access also 
refers to the full range of devices, systems, networks and data used to provide the 
outsourced services. Further, the recommendation explicitly states there should be 
no contractual limitations to the outsourcing institution’s right to audit or any form 
of fixed hierarchy in the way the rights are exercised to maintain flexibility (ibid., 49). 
Virtual or logical access is deemed to be de facto included in the audit tools both for 
institutions and competent authorities (ibid., 47).  
In practice, this means financial organizations and financial service providers relying 
on any subcontractor or 3rd party platform or infrastructure provider must carefully 
consider if the contractual chain conforms to European Banking Authority’s 
recommendations. As a case example, Microsoft (2017) Azure enables large financial 
institutions to enter into a separate contract amendment with Microsoft to meet 
their privacy, security and regulatory requirements as an entity subject to oversight 
by a regulator. By further analyzing Microsoft Guidance on complying with regulatory 
guidelines applicable to financial services institutions using Microsoft Azure in 
Singapore, the document suggests Microsoft (2016, 11) has a positive stance on 
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granting access and audit rights on a regulatory basis by stating “Another reason for 
the selection of Microsoft in this case is that it permits regulator audit and inspection 
of its data centers and in agreed circumstances inspection rights for its financial 
services customers”.  Some of the audit and access support functions can be subject 
to fee-based yearly subscription such as Microsoft Online Services FSI Customer 
Compliance Program (Microsoft 2017, 1). Similar contract amendments and 
programs can exist for other cloud service providers and the point is that these are 
typically not included in the standard agreement or online service terms and covers 
only a limited service portfolio.  Commercially, this type of special arrangements may 
involve significant cost elements, which mean the benefits of cloud would derive 
elsewhere than from plain hardware capacity pricing. 
11.3 Failure to pass on contractual obligations to subcontractors or sub-
processors 
The outsourcing institution should agree to chain outsourcing only if the 
subcontractor will also fully comply with the obligations set between the outsourcing 
institution and the outsourcing service provider (European Banking Authority 2017a, 
17). Although the cloud service provider is responsible for providing the service 
agreed with the outsourcing institution, the outsourcing institution should have 
oversight of the overall service provided regardless of whether it is provided through 
subcontractors (ibid., 66) even if there is no requirement to establish service 
monitoring spanning to subcontractor level. 
11.4 Inadequate or ad-hoc SLA monitoring process  
Outsourcing institution is obliged to review and monitor the performance of the 
overall service on an ongoing basis, regardless of whether it is provided by the cloud 
service provider or its subcontractors and evaluate against performance criteria set 
in the outsourcing contract (European Banking Authority 2017a, 16). Neglecting SLA 
monitoring and outsourcing management might lead to decrease of the standards of 
the outsourced service; the quality of the service is not as good as defined in service 
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contract or has missed opportunities to detect deteriorating service level before a 
major incident.  
11.5 Inadequate or ad-hoc risk management process 
Changes in e.g. cloud service supply chain is one example of events, which might 
affect the ability of the service provider to meet its responsibilities under the 
outsourcing agreement, and should trigger carrying out of a risk assessment by a 
financial institution. Extending the adoption of cloud services beyond the current 
scope through change management process could be another type of event, which 
could require a risk assessment to take place before approval. 
11.6 Inadequate or ad-hoc change management practices and violation 
of cloud outsourcing policy 
Over time, the outsourcing organization might change the way, how cloud services 
under a cloud service provider are consumed or the scope of adopted services 
expanded. In the worst case, the business risks are evaluated based on the original 
scope rather than against the updated range of services. Use of services, which do 
not comply with the compliance requirements, e.g. enjoy the same level of audit and 
access rights, demanded from the outsourcing financial institution, could raise a 
security incident due to non-compliance. 
11.7 Operationalizing data subject rights 
International Association of Privacy Professionals, a not-for-profit organization, 
together with TrustArc conducted a survey in September and October 2017 to 
subscribers of IAPP Daily Dashboard. The survey identified operationalizing the right 
to be forgotten and operationalizing data portability as top risks followed by 
obtaining and managing user consent, complying with international data transfer 
requirements and preparing for data breach notification (IAPP 2017, 3).  
Providing an electronic copy of personal data to conform to data portability is a topic 
online banking channels need to address to. This is more of a problem on supporting 
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services capable of integrating information sources together holding customer 
master data and providing that preferably over a single API towards the online 
channels whereas online channels could format the data to human readable and 
presentable form.   
Right to be forgotten in financial services context is a more complex process 
requiring closing of financial products such as accounts and loans before it is possible 
to terminate customer relationship and personal data from operative systems.  
However, by design online banking channels should not store personal data, but 
instead, rely on master information sources. In case of an exception, online banking 
channels could expose an API, which can be invoked to exit any personal data, rather 
than the opposite where a request would be made from the online banking channel 
to initiate the process. 
Data processing regulation, security and subject rights must also be taken care of in 
outsourcing to cloud covering also the cloud service provider including cloud 
infrastructure provider. Additionally, the geographical location of processing must be 
considered. 
11.8 Incapability to demonstrate compliance 
According to EU GDPR Article 24, the controller shall implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that 
processing is performed in accordance with the regulation (European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union 2016, 47). This means capability to document, 
where and how the data is processed or stored, and what are the technical and 
organizational controls to protect the data. In case there is no evidence backing up 
the defined controls and processes, that are documented, or the selected controls 
are not sufficient in comparison to the type of data processed, there is a risk of 
noncompliance and sanctions. 
11.9 Processing data beyond the purpose of received consent 
Processing of personal data is lawful only if the data subject has given explicit 
consent for one or more specific purposes; or it is necessary for the performance of a 
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contract to which the data subject is party; or in order to take steps at the request of 
the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation, to which the controller is subject to. (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2016, 36). Financial institutions 
must be careful, e.g. what kind of targeted marketing or segmentation they can do 
based on financial and transaction data available of customers, what information 
they can directly request from the customer, or what data could be shared between 
business service partners without prompting for request of a consent. 
11.10 Personal data breach notification and loss of reputation 
In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, 
where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the 
supervisory authority about the breach (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union 2016, 52). The notification must contain information where 
possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the 
categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned (ibid., 52). 
When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall communicate the personal data 
breach to the data subjects (ibid., 52). In addition to being capable of collecting and 
analyzing forensics information within 72 hours in relation to the data breach, a 
financial institution would have to cope with the sanctions and reputational risks due 
loss of customer confidence and trust followed by a breach.  
11.11 Vendor lock-in in cloud outsourcing 
Whether the lock-in factor comes from e.g. data, technology, service or application 
lock-in, financial institutions should according to outsourcing guidelines avoid 
situations, where they cannot exit or recover from decreased performance of service 
provider. Vendor lock-in is a synonym for substitutability barrier or tells about 
neglected assessment of substitutability and exit planning (EBA 2017a, 18). Vendor 
lock-in could also occur in case the outsourcing institution no longer possesses 
enough understanding of the business processes or service being outsourced. 
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11.12 Unproven or missing disaster recovery capabilities 
Considering how important self-service channels are for financial institutions, there 
should also be plans for cloud-based services, how to recover from failures on e.g. 
availability zone or a provider of DNS services. To effectively demonstrate that 
disaster recovery capabilities of cloud platform or service are used in the correct 
way, proper testing should be done. Testing is done to ensure there is no need for 
time-consuming and more radical architectural changes once the service is already 
published for live or during very late phase of delivery cycle. The same goes with 
backups to avoid an unacceptable level of data loss. 
12 Discussion 
12.1 Cloud outsourcing in general 
The regulative landscape of outsourcing to cloud is permissive, however, there are 
requirements such as audit and access for the institution and competent authorities 
subject to the whole outsourcing chain, which are challenging to meet contractually. 
This was indicated by all the respondents of EBA consultancy paper as can be seen in 
Appendix 3. Standard contract agreements seldom comply, unless a cloud service 
provider is specifically targeting at serve financial institutions and/or there is high 
demand explicitly from financial service companies for the offering, making it 
commercially feasible for a cloud service provider to address compliance concerns 
specific for financial services industry. 
There is little incentive to implement as few controls as possible by a financial 
institution; however, instead by centralizing common architectural building blocks 
and personal data repositories the most of the synergies can be exploited. By 
segregating the solution architecture to clearly defined components according to 
business domains, helps setting scope and boundaries for different auditing schemes 
and regulations. The same fundamental design thinking and aim of optimizing the 
synergies by having common building blocks could be applied to outsourced services 
in multi-vendor landscape assuming the suppliers are working in cloud-based custom 
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development domain or provide stateless utility services rather than focus on large 
volume market and standardized features. 
12.2 Feasibility of cloud outsourcing 
Outsourcing to cloud recommendation’s provisions for material outsourcing, which 
require special attention during outsourcing planning, due diligence, contracting, risk 
management, auditing and service level monitoring, which means the scope of 
outsourced production workload in cloud should be relatively significant to be 
commercially feasible and to have a basis for a profitable business.  
Factors increasing profitability are including but not limited to improved time-to-
market, speed of development, automation and development feedback loop, and 
quality or business advantage of the financial service. The lower the value chain is, 
the higher volumes should be moved to the cloud to be profitable. In practical terms, 
buying plain capacity (low in value chain) is most likely not profitable unless volumes 
are relatively high due to the need to subscribe to programs or additional 
professional services, which guarantee sufficient audit and access rights for a 
financial institution. There could also be additional, significant costs in case solution 
architecture requires transformation to be deployed to cloud. 
There are Nordic examples of profitable financial sector businesses run on even 
hyper-scale cloud infrastructure such as Holvi, offering digital banking services for 
entrepreneurs, and Solinor Payment Highway, which is an offering for accepting card 
payments online, both based on Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC). 
There is also an example of hybrid cloud architecture, where S-Bank offers marketing 
information about services on Microsoft Azure whereas they keep sensitive financial 
data outside public cloud (Microsoft 2015b, 2).  
12.3 Key challenging cloud outsourcing requirements 
The new Recommendations on Cloud Outsourcing by European Banking Authority 
are nothing revolutionary but rather conservative in the light of physical audit and 
access rights, which must be secured contractually covering also potential 
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subcontracting. The requirement can be seen as a principal one shared by both 
traditional outsourcing and cloud outsourcing models in financial sector. This might 
be an obstacle with certain types of cloud service providers and service delivery 
models even if at practical level a financial institution can choose to rely in risk-based 
manner to a trusted 3rd party or pooled audit results. The recommendation for 
financial institutions is also to regularly assess the content of the certifications or 
audit reports on an ongoing basis, and in particular, ensure that key controls are still 
covered in the scope of services adopted now and in the future.  
Another challenging requirement on cloud outsourcing, where applicable, is having 
proper contingency plans and exit strategies in place for all cloud outsourcing 
arrangements. Considering outsourcing scope, complexity, potential use of 
proprietary technologies or IPRs, and speed of new innovations, securing the exit 
with full scope of services and without undue disruption to its provision of services or 
adverse effects on its compliance will continue to be a challenge.   
12.4 Cloud outsourcing risk landscape 
There are different layers in outsourcing risk landscape:  
 macroprudential risks, which are monitored by supervising authorities based on the 
notifications of outsourcing deals done by financial institutions, 
 risks depending on the complexity and scale of outsourcing in scope of a financial 
institution as a whole, 
 and risks related to a specific outsourcing arrangement and performance of a 
supplier. 
 
As described earlier in the thesis, the risk landscape from a financial institution’s 
point of view, enriched with a couple of public case examples in Sweden, is well 
known and covered by EBA ICT risk assessment guideline. The guideline also covers: 
 inadequate resilience of third party or another group entity services, 
 inadequate outsourcing governance, 
 as well as inadequate security of third party or another group entity.  
 
In addition, fulfilling the compliance requirements could be highlighted as a forth 
item including, however, not limited to outsourcing arising from e.g. EU GPDR.   
The importance of mitigating these risks derives from the threats including criminals 
who know that third party suppliers can be a weak link and target them accordingly. 
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12.5 Characteristics of compliance solution architecture 
By comparing industry best practices for security and service architecture in online 
banking domain and the compliance requirements set by supervising authorities, it 
can be concluded that the level of compliance requirement setting is on very high-
level with more focus on contracting, risk management and outsourcing 
management processes. There are also regulations and provisions for data 
protection and data subject rights, however, apart from encryption and data lifecycle 
management and a few functional level requirements related to the transparency 
and privacy settings, there is plenty of room for interpretation in translating them 
into the language of engineering and usability.  
To ensure the compliance of solution and its architecture, it is proposed that its 
documentation covers traceability back to the requirements including a link or the 
original text of provision of regulation, guideline or recommendation, the 
interpretations, the implementation design, and how the solution relates to business 
and admin processes where it is intended to be used.  
Outsourcing contract is a critical component of an outsourced compliance solution or 
service architecture including exact service description of the scope and context of 
outsourcing, assets, description of responsibilities between parties, KPIs, purpose of 
data processing and any items which are excluded or not considered to be part of the 
service e.g. non-transferrable intellectual property rights.  
A technical security architecture and the security controls implemented by the 
solution, are not sufficient alone without being backed up by processes, which 
enable risk-based transparency in service management. The service contract must 
stretch to secure long-term business continuity of a financial institution and support 
handover of responsibilities as part of exit scenarios, whether it is terminated 
naturally by the expiry of the contract or triggered by deteriorated service levels. 
Certification, not only in the area of information security management system but in 
a wider context, can be seen as a fast-track for a service provider to attract and 
acquire new customers and avoid security auditing effort overhead.  
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12.6 Adoption of ISMS for cloud outsourcing 
One of the benefits of mapping compliance and regulative requirements to an 
information management system such as ISO-IEC 27001:2013 was the visibility 
gained: what type of controls and processes are required, where can synergies be 
found from existing controls, and what would be administrative burden and cost be 
expected to be associated with the compliance effort. Due to the fact that these 
types of requirements are on a high-level; standards, guidelines on how to apply the 
standards and industry best practices can help in finding approaches to actual 
implementations. 
ISO-IEC 27001:2013 also seeks for commitment from top to down and by that 
ensures better chances to succeed in implementing a range of security controls and 
objectives according to plan of controls mapped against compliance requirements. 
Having clear reporting lines and KPIs helps to gain continuous support in information 
security management. 
12.7 Inconsistencies of regulations and guidelines 
By looking at different regulations and guidelines, it is apparent that there are plenty 
of conflicts between them both in area of outsourcing, especially subcontracting, and 
data protection. Because the renewed regulation and guidelines are just about to 
enter into force, it comes as no surprise, that there is a great deal of confusion about 
how to comply and what the best practices are.    
Inconsistencies were reported by European Association of Co-operative Banks (2017, 
19) in their reply to consultation on Fintech between PSD2 Access to Accounts (XS2A) 
and Portability of Data according to the EU GDPR Art. 20.  Account servicing payment 
service providers under PSD2 are required to provide authorized PISPs and AISPs an 
access to customer account information subject to customer consent. This 
information includes sharing personal data. However, an ASPSP has no contractual 
relationship with PISP or AISP or has any means to ensure subject data protection 
rights of the 3rd party other than trusting the registry of PSD2 entities being 
supervised. 
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According to Working Party (2017b, 8), requests must be assessed on a case by case 
basis, how, if at all, such specific legislation, such as PSD2, may affect the right to 
data portability in general as meant in EU GDPR. Understanding how to interpret a 
regulatory requirement might require understanding of the hierarchy of different 
laws and their priorities to ensure correct practices in conflict of interests. 
12.8 Reliability of the results 
Many of the used information sources participated in commenting outsourcing to a 
cloud consultation paper and are practitioners in financial sector by role, or 
represented e.g. a legal firm rather than research studies or academic publications or 
relied on direct information from the authorities themselves. This means the 
research portrays more the practical concerns, issues and best practices that the 
type of organizations face in everyday life while implementing compliance 
requirements into working practices or controls. For the outsourcing part, the 
number of respondents to EBA’s consultancy paper used as a basis for analysis was 
relatively large compared to the option that this type of interview was done privately 
to a selected group of respondents. 
Considering the maturity of the subject matter, there was plenty of new information 
published all the time during the thesis research. For the quality of the research, it 
would have been beneficial to wait for more concrete case examples. The same 
applies to the interest that many Nordic financial institutions have just recently 
started to show on outsourcing based on As a Service delivery model.  
12.9 Applicability of the thesis for other industries 
The compliance architecture could be applied to any medium or large business 
according to the criteria for defining the size of a business by European Commission, 
and involving processing of personal data of EU citizens. Retail industry and e-
commerce portals are good examples of sharing many of the security concerns due 
to processing of both personal data and online transactions. However retail industry 
is neither subject to same level of supervision and auditing by authorities nor 
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compliance reporting giving them more flexibility in adoption of cloud based 
solutions. 
Considering the number of generic security requirements for the compliance 
architecture and effort required to monitor the outsourcing risks and performance, 
the architecture is not considered feasible for micro or small-sized business. 
12.10 Areas of further development 
Due to the fact that the outsourcing recommendation and EU GDPR are not yet 
effective at the time of writing, there is plenty of room for research focusing on 
decisions or sanctions and the justification of those based on security controls the 
personal data controller or processor have had in place. 
Another area of further research could be a practical case study to test the exit 
scenario of a solution architecture in financial services domain and e.g. outlining a 
self-channel architecture, which is capable of recovering in multi-cloud environment. 
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Appendices 
 Mapping of EBA recommendations on outsourcing to 
cloud against ISO-IEC 27001 and ENISA Information Assurance Framework 
control objectives and controls 
ISO 27001:2013 & ENISA IAF 
control 
EBA recommendation on outsourcing to cloud Number of 
requirements 
Information security policies 
(ISO 27001 - A.5) 
CEBS Guideline (only) 6: outsourcing institution 
should have a policy on its approach to 
outsourcing, including contingency plans and 
exit strategies 
1 
Organization of information 
security (ISO 27001 - A.6) 
CEBS Guideline (only) 2: responsibility for the 
proper management of the risks lies with an 
outsourcing institution's senior management. 
Responsibility cannot be outsourced. 
1 
Human resource security (ISO 
27001 - A.7) 
 
Personnel security (ENISA IAF - 
66.1) 
 0 
Asset management (ISO 27001 
- A.8) 
 
Asset management (ENISA IAF 
- 6.5) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
1 
Access control (ISO 27001 - 
A.9) 
 
Identity and access 
management (ENISA IAF - 6.4) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
1 
Cryptography (ISO 27001 - 
A.10) 
 
Key management (ENISA IAF - 
6.4.4) 
Encryption (ENISA IAF - 6.4.5) 
16 c. Institutions should also consider specific 
measures where necessary such as the usage of 
encryption technologies in combination with 
appropriate key management architecture for 
data in transit, data in memory, and data at 
rest. 
1 
Physical and environmental 
security (ISO 27001 - A.11) 
 
Physical security (ENISA IAF - 
6.8), Environmental controls 
(ENISA IAF - 6.9) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
1 
Operations security (ISO 27001 
- A.12) 
 
Operational security (ENISA 
IAF - 6.3) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
1 
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Communications security (ISO 
27001 - A.13) 
 
Network architecture controls 
(ENISA IAF - 6.3.3) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
 
16 c. Institutions should also consider specific 
measures where necessary such as the usage of 
encryption technologies in combination with 
appropriate key management architecture for 
data in transit, data in memory, and data at 
rest. 
2 
System acquisition, 
development and 
maintenance (ISO 27001 - 
A.14) 
16 a. Identify and classify its activities, 
processes and related data and systems as to 
the sensitivity and required protections 
 
16 c. Institutions should also consider specific 
measures where necessary such as the usage of 
encryption technologies in combination with 
appropriate key management architecture for 
data in transit, data in memory, and data at 
rest. 
2 
Supplier relationships (ISO 
27001 - A.15) 
 
Supply chain assurance (ENISA 
IAF - 6.2) 
6. Written agreement with CSP including right 
to audit, right to access 
 
7. Contractual agreements should not impede 
exercise of right of access or audit 
 
8. Exercising the right to audit in risk based 
manner  
 
14. Prior notification of a planned visit and 
cooperation of supplier written in agreement 
 
15. Guideline 8 (2) (b) and 9, outsourcing 
institutions with respect to quality and 
performance should feed into written contract 
and SLAs. 
 
17. Contractual obligation to protect data 
confidentiality, continuity of activities 
outsourced, integrity and traceability of data 
and systems also in accordance with specific 
measures (controls) identified as necessary 
 
18. Monitor the performance of activities and 
security measures in line with CEBS guideline 7 
including incidents, on an ongoing basis and 
review as appropriate. Take any corrective 
measures thereto. 
 
21; 22; 24. Agreeing of use and rules of 
subcontracting and setting forth compliance 
obligations in contract.  
 
11 
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27 c. Obligation in agreement to CSP to orderly 
transfer the activity and that of the 
subcontractors to another SP or to the direct 
management of the outsourcing institution in 
case of exit clause 
 
23. Risk assessment of impacts in case of 
changes in subcontracting 
 
25. The outsourcing institution should review 
and monitor the performance of the overall 
service on an ongoing basis regardless whether 
it is provided by CSP or its subcontractors 
Information security incident 
management (ISO 27001 - 
A.16) 
 
Incident management and 
response (ENISA IAF - 6.7.1) 
The recommendations do not include specific 
requirements for reporting of security incidents 
by institutions to their competent authorities in 
the context of cloud outsourcing (p. 24) 
0 
Information security aspects of 
business continuity 
management (ISO 27001 - 
A.17) 
 
Business continuity 
management (ENISA IAF - 6.7) 
 
9. Maintaining relevant register of information 
on material and non-material outsourcing 
activities 
 
15; 26; 27 a; 28 a, c. Guideline 6 (6) (e) 
institutions should implement arrangements to 
ensure the continuity of the services provided 
by the outsourcing service provider. Policy 
should include contingency planning and a 
clearly defined exit strategy 
 
27 b; 28 d. Transition plan and validation in 
terms of testing for the case of transferring 
existing outsourcing activities. Define success 
criteria for the plan. 
 
28 a; 29. The outsourcing institution should 
include indicators that can trigger the exit plan 
in their ongoing service monitoring and 
oversight of the services provided by their CSP 
4 
Compliance (ISO 27001 - A.18) 1; 16 b. Materiality assessment (compliance 
documentation) 
 
2. Duty to adequately inform supervisors and 
provide and maintain relevant register of 
information on outsourcing (compliance 
reporting and documentation) 
 
3. Risk analysis for the material activities 
outsourced (compliance documentation) 
 
4; 5. Maintain relevant register of information 
on material and non-material outsourcing 
activities (compliance documentation) 
6 
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9. Acquiring of right skills and knowledge to 
perform effective and relevant audit and/or 
assessment of cloud solutions (knowledge and 
skills) 
 
19; 20. Take special care when entering into 
and managing outsourcing agreements 
undertaken outside the EEA due to possible 
data protection risks and risks to effective 
supervision 
Legal requirements (ENISA IAF 
- 6.10) 
20 1 
Data and services portability 
(ENISA IAF - 6.6) 
Indirectly same as 15; 26; 27 a; 28 a, c. 
Guideline 6 (6) (e) 
0 
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 Mapping of EU GDPR requirements for processor against ISO-
IEC 27001 and ENISA Information Assurance Framework control objectives and 
controls 
ISO 27001:2013 & 
ENISA IAF control 
EU GDPR Article summary Number of 
requirements 
ISO 27001 - Chapter 3 Article 4: Definitions 
 
Definitions should be aligned with any information 
security classifications an organization may have 
impacting selected security controls for processing 
1 
ISO 27001 - A.9.4.2 
Secure log-on 
procedures 
 
ENISA IAF - 6.4.5: 
Encryption 
 
ENISA IAF - 6.4.7: 
Credential compromise 
or theft 
Article 87: Processing of the national identification 
number 
 
Member States may further determine the specific 
conditions for the processing of a national 
identification number or any other identifier of 
general application. 
 
Swedish Data Protection Authority: 
Dataskyddsutredningen som har 
föreslagit att sådana uppgifter ska få 
behandlas bara om det är klart 
motiverat med hänsyn till ändamålet 
med behandlingen, vikten av en säker 
identifiering eller något annat 
beaktansvärt skäl. Bestämmelsen 
motsvarar tidigare bestämmelse i 
personuppgiftslagen. (Datainspektionen. 
2017). 
 
1 
ISO 27001 - A.5 - A.18 1. f) Personal data is processed in a manner that 
ensures appropriate security of the personal data, 
including protection against unauthorized or 
unlawful processing and against accidental loss, 
destruction or damage, using appropriate technical 
or organizational measures (‘integrity and 
confidentiality’) 
 
Article 32 
 
The controller and the processor shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures 
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, 
including inter alia as appropriate: 
 
2. the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and resilience of processing 
systems and services 
By approaching 
this requirement 
in terms of ISO 
27001 this would 
mean 114 
controls to be in 
place. 
 
 
ISO 27001 - A.17.1.2 
Implementing 
information security 
continuity 
Article 32 
The controller and the processor shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures 
2 
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ISO 27001 - A.17.1.3 
Verify, review and 
evaluate information 
security continuity 
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, 
including inter alia as appropriate: 
 
3. the ability to restore the availability and access 
to personal data in a timely manner in the event of 
a physical or technical incident 
 
4. a process for regularly testing, assessing and 
evaluating the effectiveness of technical and 
organizational measures for ensuring the security 
of the processing 
ISO 27001 - A.18.1.1 
Identification of 
applicable legislation 
and contractual 
requirements 
Article 1: Subject-matter and objectives 
Article 2: Material scope of processing 
Article 3: Territorial scope 
 
Article 28  
Processor  
 
incl. assists the controller in ensuring compliance 
with the obligations pursuant to Articles 32 to 36 
taking into account the nature of processing and 
the information available to the processor 
 
Article 31  
Cooperation with the supervisory authority  
 
Article 32  
Security of processing  
 
Artcicle 33 
The processor shall notify the controller without 
undue delay after becoming aware of a personal 
data breach 
 
Article 34  
Communication of a personal data breach to the 
data subject  
 
Article 35  
Data protection impact assessment  
 
Article 36  
Prior consultation 
6 plus 
requirements 
referred from 
Article 28 
ISO 27001 - A.18.1.4 
Privacy and protection 
of personally 
identifiable information 
Article 32 
 
The controller and the processor shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures 
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk 
6 
ISO 27001 - A.10.1.1 
Policy on the use of 
cryptographic controls 
 
Article 32 
The controller and the processor shall implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures 
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, 
including inter alia as appropriate: 
2 
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ISO 27001 - A.18.1.5 
Regulation of 
cryptographic controls 
 
ENISA IAF - 6.4.5: 
Encryption 
 
1. which may include  pseudonymisation or 
encryption of personal data 
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 Obstacles for getting full audit and access rights among 
EBA consultancy paper respondents 
Organization Response to audit and access right Interpretation of 
practicality 
Association of 
Financial Markets 
in Europe (AFME) 
AFME views that the requirements for securing rights to 
access and audit could be an obstacle for financial 
institutions when outsourcing to Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs) 
Problematic 
contractually 
Alternative 
Investment 
Management 
Association (AIMA) 
 
Access to business premises: Requiring physical access 
to where data is stored may make it impossible for 
asset management firms to use public cloud services. 
We therefore consider that datacenters should be 
specifically carved out of the references to “business 
premises” and “operations centers” in paragraphs 6(a), 
10(a), 14(a) and 14(b) or the right of physical access to 
datacenters should be substituted for a right of access 
to the relevant systems information. In other words, 
seeing racks of blinking lights is of little use but being 
able to see infrastructure diagrams and setup might be 
useful. Increasingly physical infrastructure is being 
replaced with Software-defined Infrastructure so there 
is nothing to actually see – or it could be split over 
multiple locations on shared physical infrastructure; 
Problematic due 
physical access 
Asociación 
Española de Banca 
(AEB) 
 
Two main challenges arise when negotiating contract 
arrangements with CSPs: (i) CSPs reluctance or inability 
to assume contract terms in practice (e.g. user's and 
supervisor's right to audit), and (ii) CSP are not always 
willing neither to negotiate their template contracts to 
accommodate to different regulations and national or 
entity specificities nor to include non-regulated issues 
into contractual arrangements 
Problematic 
contractually 
Association of 
Foreign Banks 
(AFB) 
The FCA guidelines1 acknowledge that a visit from a 
regulator may be disruptive to the provider as well as 
having security implications. 
Problematic due 
physical access 
Banking & 
Payments 
Federation Ireland 
(BPFI) 
 
While institutions pursue access and audit rights for all 
cloud outsourcing, institutions may not always secure 
this right with all CSPs due to practical implications on 
providers around allowing access to physical 
datacenters and the security implications. It is therefore 
suggested that institutions in such cases may rely on 
third party certification and third party audit reports. 
Problematic due 
physical access 
Financial Conduct 
Authority 
The FCA guidelines1 acknowledge that a visit from a 
regulator may be disruptive to the provider as well as 
having security implications. Conversely, the EBA 
guidelines require further clarification as to potential 
disruption and security issues 
Problematic due 
physical access 
Cloud 
Infrastructure 
Services Providers 
in Europe 
We welcome the draft recommendation in paragraph 7 
that an outsourcing institution and cloud provider 
should agree upon “alternative ways” to provide 
assurance “when the performance of audits or the use 
of certain audit techniques might create a risk for 
another client’s environment.” This seems to imply, but 
Problematic due 
physical access 
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does not explicitly state, that the EBA recognizes 
physical access to premises, such as data centers, 
presents risks to cloud infrastructure and customer data 
that should be avoided. To promote convergence on 
how financial institutions exercise their access and audit 
rights, it would be welcomed if the EBA would clearly 
define what is meant with using “alternative ways” to 
achieve assurance. 
Cloud Security 
Alliance 
 
Are there any specific recommendations regarding 
access to datacenters? Guidance from other bodies 
such as the FCA recognizes/accepts datacenters may be 
treated differently by CSPs when considering access to 
business premises e.g. “…for legitimate security 
reasons, may limit access to such sites – such as data 
centers. And …does not necessarily include data 
centers.” Is an abridged extract from the FCA finalized 
guidance FC16-5 document. CSA STAR is widely 
acknowledged as the leading security assurance 
programme for Cloud Security. STAR encompasses key 
principles of transparency, rigorous auditing, and 
harmonization of standards. Furthermore, tools like CSA 
STARWatch can help organizations manage/streamline 
compliance efforts. 
N/A 
Czech Banking 
Association (CBA) 
One of the EBA recommendations on outsourcing to 
cloud providers is "unrestricted rights of inspection and 
auditing" which is according to our experience difficult 
to enforce to the contracts with cloud providers. 
Further clarifications should be provided and therefore, 
we would appreciate to have specific examples of 
conditions which are considered as acceptable. 
Problematic 
contractually 
DXC TECHNOLOGY Access and audit rights are of paramount importance to 
any OSP (Cloud provider) due to security and 
contractual requirements. Complete access to data and 
external rights of inspection and audit cannot be 
granted due to the nature of the services provided and 
confidentiality requirements. Furthermore the audit 
access should only apply to service locations and not all 
business locations.  
 
Access by a third party and full access by a statutory 
auditor including devices, systems etc may fall foul of 
contractual requirements of clients this therefore may 
not be acceptable in public or virtual private where 
services are delivered in a multi-tenant environment.  
 
Customer’s auditors shall have no access to any shared 
infrastructure or to data concerning other DXC 
customers or DXC operations.  
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access 
Deutsche Bank AG 
 
Applying the ‘traditional’ access and audit rights 
concept to cloud outsourcing services is a major 
obstacle in practice, as cloud providers strongly push 
back on the inclusion of the full range of access and 
audit provisions. This reflects the fact that CSPs are 
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access and non-
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providing highly standardized services to a large volume 
of customers. This business model is not comparable to 
traditional outsourcing relationships, which are much 
more bespoke. At its core, public cloud provides is a 
commodity service – it is consistent no matter the client 
and thus designed accordingly. 
 
The right to on-site audits is not an accepted industry 
standard for CSPs and its introduction leads to 
prolonged contract negotiations. It is typically a red-line 
for most CSPs due to issues of confidentiality and 
privacy of other customer’s data, and interference of 
the standard processes on which cloud services are 
provided. Further, physical access is also less beneficial 
given the increasing dispersion of data across facilities 
and even countries. 
standard 
approach 
Deutsche Börse 
Group 
Particularly the prescribed right to physical access to 
relevant business premises of the cloud service provider 
should be further clarified in order to avoid unnecessary 
requests to physical access to e.g. datacenters, systems 
and networks of cloud service providers, which might 
result in a disproportionate burden for cloud service 
providers and thereby create itself an operational risk. 
Burdensome regulations on excessive audit rights might 
hinder potential cloud service providers to offer 
services to the financial industry and as such might lead 
to insufficient and concentrated offers of cloud 
solutions. 
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access 
Division Bank and 
Insurance Austrian 
Federal Economic 
Chamber 
 
Should the compliance with this framework not 
exclusively be placed on banks, which do not have the 
ability to impose their conditions to CSPs 
Problematic 
contractually 
Dutch Banking 
Association 
(Nederlandse 
Vereniging van 
Banken) 
 
NVB considers full right of access for institutions at 
major cloud service providers quite unrealistic. 
Individual financial institutions lack the bargaining 
power to receive this right to access. NVB concludes 
that most European banks likely won’t be able to 
exercise this right of access. This is not the case in the 
US and consequently this results in an unlevel playing 
field with US based banks. 
Problematic 
contractually 
ESBG EBA should consider including in section 4.3 dispositions 
ensuring that virtual access to data, with continuous 
monitoring capabilities for the outsourcing institution, 
is granted to outsourcing institutions and competent 
authorities. Otherwise, these recommendations risk of 
soon becoming irrelevant in practical terms.  
 
Two main challenges arise when negotiating contract 
arrangements with CSPs: (i) CSPs are not always able to 
comply with specific contract terms in practice (e.g. 
user’ and supervisor’s right to audit), and (ii) CSP are 
not always willing neither to negotiate their template 
Problematic 
contractually and 
physical access 
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contracts in order to accommodate to different 
regulations and national or entity specificities nor to 
include non-regulated issues into contractual 
arrangements. The position CSPs are adopting in 
contractual negotiations arise from the fact that they 
are not required to comply with the regulatory and 
supervisory rules banks are entitled to. 
Electronic Money 
Association 
 
The recommendations that the outsourcing institution 
ensures that the CSP outsourcing agreement provides 
“to the institution’s statutory auditor full access to the 
CSP business premises” in Section 4.3 (Clause 6a) and 
“unrestricted rights of inspection and auditing (right of 
audit)” (Clause 6b) ignore the dynamics of the business 
relationship between financial service providers and the 
larger, global CSPs. The latter serve tens of thousands of 
outsourcing entities using hundreds of locations. It is 
unlikely that an outsourcing institution could secure 
access to all CSP business premises; instead, we 
propose that the focus of access is on CSP premises and 
processes directly involved in the delivery of the 
services of the outsourcing institution. 
Problematic 
contractually and 
non-standard 
approach 
 Eurofinas We appreciate the coherent approach adopted by the 
EBA on the basis of risk and proportionality. The 
guidelines’ clarification on the ability for an outsourcing 
institution to fulfil its audit obligations through pooled 
audits and third-party certifications is especially 
important for small and medium-sized institutions. The 
possibility of pooled audits together with other clients 
of the same cloud service provider allows for the more 
efficient usage of relevant and highly specialized 
expertise with the minimum level of disruption and risk 
for other cloud clients’ environment and data. In this 
context, we believe that further guidance would be 
beneficial to further clarify the necessary qualifications 
of competent third-party auditors and certifiers. 
N/A 
EUROPEAN 
ASSOCIATION OF 
CO-OPERATIVE 
BANKS 
Access and auditing rights are usually the most 
challenging part of the negotiation with cloud service 
providers. These requirements are not included in 
standard contract terms and need usually additional 
contractual provision. Cloud service providers usually 
prefer third party auditing which they can publish to all 
clients instead of separate audits made by every single 
client. The possibility to use third party certifications 
and pooled audit with other clients are therefore 
warmly welcomed.  
Problematic 
contractually and 
non-standard 
approach 
European Banking 
Federation 
Physical access to premises hosting the cloud 
infrastructure is often a point of tension in negotiations 
with CSPs, who may be reluctant to allow customers 
into their datacenters for legitimate security and 
confidentiality reasons. Furthermore, in a globalized 
and distributed cloud model, access to the physical 
location delivers a negligible outcome, other than the 
most basic one of physical security and access checks.  
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access 
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Finance Denmark The requirements in section 6 (a) and (b) implies that 
the outsourcing company and its auditor should, as a 
rule, have full access to the supplier's right of access 
and unrestricted rights of inspection and audit. These 
requirements are very far-reaching and, moreover 
widespread than what is applicable after the 
outsourcing guidelines. It can be assumed that the 
requirements will be difficult to get a supplier to accept 
and, incidentally, customer initiated, customer-specific 
physical inspection / audit is not the most appropriate 
method of securing deliveries either from a cost or 
security point of view. 
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access 
Finance Norway - N/A 
German Banking 
Industry 
Committee 
Securing the right to access and audit (paragraphs 6 to 
14) is a major obstacle for financial institutions in 
outsourcing to CSPs. Requiring every institution to have 
access to the CSP is not feasible and may actually 
increase the overall security risk to the CSP (i.e. more 
people on premises). An alternative solution, which still 
addresses the risk / concerns of these outsourcing 
arrangements, would be to allow financial institutions 
to leverage existing industry standards and 
certifications of CSPs, which cover many requirements 
proposed by the EBA. 
 
As pointed out in chapter 3 (Background and rationale – 
fourth paragraph, last sentence), large Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs) may be seen to constitute critical 
infrastructure for (the financial) industry – in a similar 
fashion to major internet service providers. Hence, 
institutions cannot be made to bear the burden of 
auditing CSPs of this caliber. 
Problematic due 
non-feasibility 
and physical 
access 
HyTrust - N/A 
IBM IBM recommends the EBA consider this approach as an 
alternative to individual FI physical examination and 
audit of compliance of CSP Data Centers 
 
IBM is concerned that an unrestricted approach to the 
introduction of financial industry wide physical audit 
access rights to Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Data 
Centers, will increase operational risk to the Financial 
Services Sector, not diminish it, and that this is counter 
intuitive to the aims of using a secure cloud outsourced 
solution.  IBM strongly believes there is need to focus 
on cloud relevant audit and control improvement 
opportunities, and to avoid reliance on traditional 
legacy systems audit and control approaches.  To this 
end, IBM strongly recommends the regulatory 
recognition, or adoption, of independent third party 
audits based on recognized international standards e.g. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) Trust Services Principles or equivalent 
Problematic due 
physical access 
and non-standard 
approach 
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International Standard for Assurance Engagements 
(ISAE3402) 
Interessengemeins
chaft Kreditkarten 
 
IK suggests to explicitly consider the concept of multi-
tenant service providers with respect to access and 
audit rights in DR 4.3 in a proportionate manner and to 
build on it as a frequently applied standard in the IT-
processing industry by addressing specific practical 
requirements of multi-tenant service providers. In this 
context it is proportionate as EBA suggested to either 
apply pooled customer audits or that institutions be 
provided by the cloud provider with external audit 
reports considering compliance with industry IT-security 
standards and certification requirements such as 
compliance with ISO 27000 standards and auditing and 
reporting on data protection compliance. 
Problematic due 
non-standard 
approach 
London Stock 
Exchange Group 
We observe that it is often difficult to get cloud 
providers to disclose their regulatory compliant terms, 
and ultimately, is often a matter of negotiation with 
cloud providers. Although these arrangements are 
often seen as outsourcing by regulators, the cloud 
terms do not always match up to the standards 
required of outsourcing documentation. As a cloud 
user, we note that guidance provided by the EBA and 
various other regulators is helpful, but if providers do 
not adhere to it, then it restricts our ability to use them 
and to fully leverage from the benefits of cloud. We 
believe that it would be beneficial for regulators to 
provide further clarity and take a more flexible/risk 
based approach to the definition of what constitutes 
“cloud outsourcing”, as treating all cloud services as 
“outsourcing” inhibits a regulated customer taking up 
the benefits that cloud provides considering cloud 
suppliers are often reluctant to adhere to traditional 
outsourcing terms in contracts. 
Problematic 
contractually 
Microsoft We recommend that the EBA further emphasize the 
risks which physical audits of datacenters can create 
and the need to take an appropriate and proportionate 
approach in this regard. Protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity and security of data and overall systems is of 
the utmost importance to financial institutions and 
their customers. Physical audits of datacenters, as 
opposed to other cloud provider business premises, 
upon which services are provided to hundreds or 
thousands of financial institutions creates unnecessary 
risk where the same level or higher levels of oversight 
can be achieved by alternative means. As most 
regulators recognize, actual on-site audits of 
datacenters is unnecessary and obtaining information 
and underlying evidence of controls and their 
implementation, is what matters from a supervisory 
perspective. Thus, it is the mechanisms under which 
cloud providers make such information available that is 
important. So long as customers who have a need to 
Problematic due 
physical access 
93 
 
 
obtain information can obtain access to it, including 
through self-help tools offered at scale, this should be 
sufficient to meet audit requirements without imposing 
undue burdens on either cloud providers or financial 
institutions. 
Nasdaq In the context of access and audit rights (section 4.3), 
Nasdaq believes that it would be more appropriate to 
require outsourcing agreements to include a right for 
competent authorities to access “relevant business 
centers” of the cloud outsourcing provider, rather than 
“head offices”, as this may not be relevant for the 
particular services provided under the relevant 
arrangement. Also, very extensive audit and access 
rights, that also include areas not immediately relevant 
to the particular service, may not be possible to achieve 
in relation to the service providers. 
Problematic due 
unlimited access 
and audit rights 
PayPal Europ We welcome the possibility for the outsourcing 
institution to use a range of tools in addition to its own 
audit resources: third-party certification, third party 
audits and pool audits. 
N/A 
Pinsent Masons Auditing the provision of an IT service is a very different 
scenario from the many other scenarios in which 
financial institutions must meet auditing requirements 
in respect of how their businesses are conducted. The 
EBA should focus on the principle of proportionality in 
making recommendations regarding the extent to 
which auditors and regulators require access to 
information and premises in order to conduct audits of 
cloud services and acknowledge that rules which are 
necessary in other auditing contexts are not 
appropriate and need not to be followed in a 
technology service provision context. 
 
As a key example, the value of physically inspecting 
datacenters in terms of assessing the risk of the services 
being provided is widely acknowledged as being 
extremely low. 
Problematic due 
physical access 
Swift SWIFT understands the EBA is proposing that 
outsourcing institutions ensure they have agreements 
with cloud service providers in place and in writing. 
Further the EBA proposes that such agreements should 
stipulate that the cloud service providers undertake the 
obligation to allow access to its business premises and 
gives unrestricted rights to inspection and auditing by 
the outsourcing institutions.   
 
While we understand the EBA’s overarching intent with 
this proposal, we believe that these measures are 
redundant where alternative existing arrangements are 
already in place, which serve the same purpose and 
meet the same objectives as the recommendations set 
out in this proposal. 
Problematic due 
non-standard 
approach 
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Smart Payment 
Association 
- N/A 
Standard Chartered In general, with regards to audit provision and its 
intended purpose with respect to CSPs, one of the 
reasons CSPs do not permit access to datacenters is 
because of their security requirements, and given the 
nature of this industry there often may not be much 
information to gain from direct access to a physical 
center. As such, it might be more helpful to the 
outsourcing institution if CSPs demonstrate that their 
processes were properly performing their roles, for 
example in systems operations centers, instead of 
focusing on the specifics of negotiating contractual 
terms, notice periods and fees. This may be more 
beneficial and result in a better outcome in terms of 
security. For instance, CSPs could be required to have 
their own audits, covering specific issues identified by 
and agreed across regulators, which would then be 
disclosed to all their clients and regulators. 
Problematic due 
physical access 
and non-standard 
approach 
Temenos In the case of a public cloud utilizing a virtualized 
environment, a visit to a datacenter will not practically 
assist in obtaining access to data or devices and will be 
of limited benefit. Large datacenters are extremely 
secure and the locations of the centers are confidential. 
Visitors to a datacenter create a security risk and hyper 
scale datacenter providers do not encourage such visits. 
 
Most cloud providers would expect the institutions and 
its auditors to rely on formal certifications from third 
parties. 
Problematic due 
physical access 
and non-standard 
approach 
Verband der 
Auslandsbanken in 
Deutschland e.V. | 
Association of 
Foreign Banks in 
Germany 
Regarding the provision set out in lit. a), it has to be 
taken into account that it will be unrealistic for all users 
of cloud services and their auditors to have "full access" 
to the business premises of the cloud service providers. 
Not only do cloud service providers have multiple 
business premises around the world and data from one 
institution or group might be stored in multiple 
jurisdictions due to cost efficiency and capacity of the 
cloud service provider, but also due to security reasons 
a diversification on different premises is often made. 
Keeping the "on premises control tourism" out of all 
facilities is part of the security plan of most cloud 
service providers. Both location of such premises and 
the exact handling of data storage is part of the service 
providers' business secret. Therefore, it is foreseeable 
that it is hardly impossible for relatively small 
customers of cloud service providers to negotiate 
access to business premises as well as insight into the 
security infrastructures of cloud service providers into 
the outsourcing contract. Such scenario might be 
possible for those customers representing a high value 
to the service provider but certainly not for all 
customers. 
Problematic 
contractually and 
due physical 
access 
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Yorkshire Building 
Society Group 
- N/A 
BBVA These recommendations should include the possibility 
of replacing the access and audit right in case the CSPs 
hold Third Party certifications recognized by Competent 
Authorities. 
 
Certification processes would mitigate a side effect that 
will become relevant as CSPs have a higher number of 
Financial Institutions as customers. Indeed, it would be 
very difficult to assist auditors appointed by each of 
their customers, as this continuous affluence of 
auditors could disrupt their activities. Moreover, given 
the nature of cloud services, having access to the data 
center where data are located is an unattainable 
requirement, since data are usually distributed and 
replicated among different data centers. 
 
Given that introducing these requirements in contracts 
with CSPs, whose services are not only offered to 
Financial Institutions, is usually burdensome for 
Financial Institutions, the creation of a mechanism that 
guarantees that CSPs are aware of the requirements 
above and accept them, would ease the negotiation 
with CSPs and foster cloud adoption. 
Problematic 
contractually, due 
non-standard 
approach and 
physical access 
 
 
 
